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Accountability and International
Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and
Legitimacy
Paul B. Stephan*
The domain of legal rules laid down by international bodies has
grown enormously. Laws that have an international source influence
a far larger portion of the world's commerce today than they did sixty
or even twenty years ago. The enhanced significance and consequences of these laws raises an important question: What safeguards
do we employ to increase the chances that they will do some good?
More specifically, what processes hold international lawmakers accountable for their decisions?
The debate in the United States over the adoption of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round
Agreements has brought these questions to the fore. Critics on both
the left and the right decry what they claim is a surrender of national
sovereignty to secretive and unaccountable international technocrats.
They assert that the establishment of NAFTA and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) will mean that state and federal legislatures no
longer may decide what kind of environmental safeguards or standards of consumer and worker protection we will have. They predict
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that international bodies will impose bad rules that we will be hard
pressed to avoid.'
The shrill and often dubious manner in which some of those critics press their attack should not deter us from considering the serious
issues they raise. When it comes to domestic law, we regard accountability as fundamental. Unaccountable lawmakers 'are in some deep
sense illegitimate. In free and democratic societies, we insist on both
a right to investigate and criticize lawmakers and the existence of
some mechanism for removing them when they have dissatisfied us.
To be sure, in modem states a great deal of practical lawmaking rests
in the hands of bureaucrats and judges, neither of whom have to face
an electorate to remain in office. But both of these institutions remain
subject to legislative discipline, and legislators in turn have to answer
to the voters for the way in which they manage these officials. Mediated accountability may be weaker, and some would argue that it is
insufficient, but it still exists.
International lawmakers largely face weaker constraints on their
behavior. They normally receive their mandate from a consortium of
executive branches of national governments. Only some of these executives must stand for direct elections, and in many cases the exercise
of the authority they delegate to international lawmakers is not subject to subsequent legislative ratification. The European Union offers
the most important example of international lawmaking substantially
freed from parliamentary oversight.'
Even when domestic legislatures must approve an internationally
generated law, legislators may have less freedom to alter or repudiate
the proposal than they do with respect to domestic measures. As a
practical matter, most national legislatures have only two means of
disciplining international lawmakers, because substituting a different
1 For attacks from the left, see, e.g., Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5
F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 685 (1994); Ralph Nader, William Greider &
Margaret Atwood, Tim CASE AGAiNST FREE TRADE: GATT, NAFTA AND 'rm GLOBAUZAION OF CORPORATE POWaR (1993); THE CASE AGAINST Tim GLOBAL EcoNoMY: AND A
TURN TOWARD rm LocAL (Jerry Mander, Edward Goldsmith & Barbara Ras eds. 1996); Lau-

rence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-FormMethod in ConstitutionalInterpretation,108 H~av. L. REv. 1221 (1995). On the right, see, e.g., S. 16,104th Cong.,
(1995) (bill to create domestic tribunal to review WTO dispute resolution decisions); H.R. 1434,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (same); H. Ross PEROT & PAT CHOATE, SAVE YOUR JOB, SAVE
OUR CouNrr-f. WHY NAFTA MUST BE STOPPED - Now! (1993).
2 In theory, the European Parliament might impose a check on EU Council lawmaking. At
the present time, however, the Parliament plays an insignificant role in the legislative process.
Cf. J.H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht
Decision, 1 EUR. L.J. 219 (1995).
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rule is not an option. They can reject the rule generated through the
international process, or they can withhold funds from the lawmaking
body. With respect to multilateral bodies, each of these variants is
problematic. Rejection or a dues default may entail exit from the organization generating the rule, not simply negation of a particular proposal. But these organizations offer significant benefits to their
members, and few international rules impose costs on a particular
country so great as to justify resigning from a desirable club.
I want to consider the question of accountability for international
lawmakers from both positive and normative perspectives. To what
extent do international bodies operate without effective constraints on
their lawmaking, and what influence do accountability deficits have on
the content of the rules these bodies generate? To the extent we
should worry about lack of accountability in international lawmaking,
how might we address the problem? Finally, in what ways should our
understanding of how international lawmaking operates affect what
we write and teach about the rules it generates?
In the first part of this paper, I describe the lawmaking processes
of several international bodies with an eye toward identifying disciplinary mechanisms. In the second part, I attempt a theory of the political economy of international lawmaking. In particular, I suggest what
factors may motivate international lawmakers and how weak constraints on their behavior may influence what they do. In the third
part, I test this theory. The conclusion wrestles with the normative
implications of the theory.
I.

THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAWS

The term "international laws" needs definition, because so many
scholars and advocates invoke international law in so many different
contexts for so many different purposes. I will concentrate on two
kinds of rules: those that govern the primary conduct of private persons and government organs in their dealings with private persons,
and those that tell national and subnational governments what kinds
of rules of the first sort they may and may not promulgate. The
formula "a person who by acting unreasonably causes harm must
compensate the injured person" is a rule of the sort I want to examine,
as is the formula "a state may not regulate conduct unless it bears
some reasonable relationship to the regulating state."
What I am not interested in are administrative matters, such as
that expressed by the formula "the Trade Representative will conduct
all international trade negotiations on behalf of the United States."
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Issues that largely involve state-to-state relations, such as the recognition of governments, the permissible uses of force, and state boundaries, fall outside the scope of this essay. Accordingly, I am leaving out
of my inquiry large bodies of material that many specialists would
consider at the heart of international law.
This focus stems from an assumption about accountability and an
intuition about how accountability works. I assume that the kinds of
accountability that matter are those by which the governed exercise
control over their governors. When the state makes demands of its
subjects, accountability means that the subjects have some means of
affecting those demands, either by choosing in some fashion who may
exercise the power to make those demands (voice) or by taking steps
to place themselves outside their scope (exit).' My intuition is that
subjects are largely concerned with the content of rules governing
their behavior and the processes by which those rules are formed.
That is to say, I believe U.S. voters may care greatly about the content
of international trade agreements that affect how much they pay in
import duties and what kinds of goods and services they may import
and export, but do not have much interest in which government
agency crafts the proposal that the President ultimately submits to the
Congress for approval. This intuition is not meant to dismiss all questions of administration, as voters clearly care whether a government
employs its resources effectively or not. Most of all, voters pay close
attention to what benefits they get from the government and at what
cost. But it seems reasonable to believe that, issues of cost and benefit
aside, subjects are largely indifferent to how a government is run and,
with respect to international relations, how governments conduct their
relations with one another, up until that moment where the government begins issuing them orders.
International bodies promulgate laws, so conceived, in a variety
of ways. Public international organizations such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) and the Council of the European Union
(EU) legislate rules of general applicability with the expectation that
member states will implement them.4 Yet other organizations, such as
the United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCI3 The allusion, I hope obvious, is to ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY RESPONSES TO DECLUNE IN FiRMs, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).

4 Specialists will recognize that the European Union was, until 1994, the European Communities, comprising the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. Throughout this paper I will use the term
"EU" to refer to both the present body and its predecessors.
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TRAL) and the privately constituted International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law (UNIDROIT) and Hague Conference on Private International
Law (Hague Conference), draft conventions and model contracts for
individual states to enact and private parties to adopt. Some international adjudicative organs generate something like a common law
through the resolution of particular problems. For example, the
WTO's Dispute Settlement Body and the European Court of Justice
behave in a fashion that looks more like lawmaking than law finding.
The staff of bodies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
offers advice as to how general international rules apply to particular
cases. What these processes have in common is that they produce
rules that purport to govern the future conduct of particular actors
over some specified range of activity. For the sake of clarity of analysis, I will distinguish among the public legislating, private legislating,
dispute resolution and administrative interpretation functions.
A.

Public Legislation

The constitutions of most international bodies establish a procedure by which the member states, acting collectively either by consensus or through some sort of majority or supermajority voting, may
promulgate rules governing activities within the body's competence.
The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, for example, provides for both interpretation and amendment of the various
WTO agreements, in some cases by a three-quarters vote of the membership and in others by unanimous consent.5 The IMF Articles of
Agreement contain comparable provisions. 6 The Convention on the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development authorizes
the members collectively to issue binding norms governing subjects
such as competition policy and bribery.7 In each instance, the rules
these bodies have the authority to adopt are both legislative, in that
they take the form of generally applicable norms, and public, in that
membership of the lawmaking body is limited to representatives of
5 Final Act Embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, art. IX (1994), reprintedin OFFIcE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF Tim
PRESIDENT, FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
6 Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1944, 60 Stat. 1401, 2
U.N.T.S. 39, arts. HI, XII, XV, as amended,20 U.S.T 2775; 29 U.S.T. 2203; T.I.A.S. No. 11898.
7 Convention on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Dec. 14,
1960, art. 5(a), 12 U.S.T. 1728, 1734, 888 U.N.T.S. 179, 185.
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states, rather than private organizations, and the formation of the rule
is complete when the international body has acted.
Much public legislating by international bodies addresses two sets
of actors - member states and the organs of the lawmaking body. For
example, were the WTO, acting through its Council, to interpret one
of the Uruguay Round agreements, the organization would expect
member states to conform their behavior to that interpretation, and
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body would apply that interpretation
where relevant. But neither the component organs of member states,
in particular their judicial bodies, nor private persons could regard
such rules as directly applicable to their conduct. As is true in many
areas of international law, the various agreements constituting the
WTO by their terms require each member to enact domestic laws implementing these accords. This legislation, not the international
agreements, establishes the operative rules for domestic actors.8
In one important case, however, the public legislation of an international body does purport to regulate the primary activity of private
persons and to supply a rule for national courts to enforce. Legislation of the Council of the EU, a body comprising representatives of
the executive branches of the fifteen member states, supersedes the
members' domestic law and binds their domestic courts. The members of the EU, and in particular their judicial bodies,"have embraced
the "direct effect" doctrine first articulated by the European Court of
Justice. As a result, domestic courts that otherwise have no power of
judicial review may nullify national legislation that, in their view, conflicts with EU law.9
8 I am putting aside the question of whether rules promulgated by organizations such as the
WTO or the OECD would have direct effect in those countries, such as Germany, Italy, Japan
and Russia, whose constitutions announce a commitment to applying international law in cases
where international and domestic norms conflict. At least for WTO rules and EU members, the
problem does not appear to exist, because the decision of the Council adopting the Uruguay
Round Agreements explicitly reserves for the EU organs the authority to implement the Agreements. WTO Agreement art. XVI(4); cf. Opinion Pursuant to Article 228(6) of the EC Treaty,
1994 E.C.R. 5627. See generally Fernando Castillo de la Torre, The Status of GATT in EC Law,

Revisited - The Consequences of the Judgment on the Banana Import Regime for the Enforcement
of the Uruguay Round Agreements, J. WoRLD TnADE, Feb. 1995, at 53.
9 See Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585. One should note that, at least in theory, the legitimacy of EU law does not necessaril depend on the consent of even the executive of every
member state. In areas where the EU is specifically empowered by one of the provisions of the
Treaty of Rome, the Council may adopt legislation by a "qualified majority," consisting of 62 out
of the total of 87 size-weighted votes allocated among the 15 members, with no fewer than 10
members voting in favor. Decision of the Council of the European Union of 1 January 1995
Adjusting the Instruments Concerning the Accession of New Members to the European Union.
1995 OJ. (L 1) 3. This rule was further modified by the so-called Ioannina Compromise, which
commits the Council to respect even smaller blocker minorities. Furthermore, lurking in the
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Putting aside the issue of domestic effect, one may discern several
fundamental characteristics of international public legislation. Where
international bodies legislate, it is the executive branches of the member states that vote. Occasionally legislatures will tell the executive
what to do, but in many, although not all, countries such direction
occurs infrequently and may be disregarded.' ° More often, legislatures rely on the terms by which they initially accede to an international organization to limit what their executives, acting through those
organizations, can accomplish. And when international organizations
later supersede such restrictions, the legislature may be left with a
take-it-or-leave-it proposition. At a minimum, it will not be able to
modify what the organization produces without forcing an additional
round of negotiations. And if it refuses to accept the internationally
agreed product and cannot force other countries to make changes, the
legislature either will have to accede to an action that disregards its
previous instructions or force the executive to resign from the
organization."
Some international bodies organize formal bargaining sessions
with the express purpose of allowing members to promulgate new legislation affecting the organization's functions. Perhaps the most significant example is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) negotiating rounds. The last two iterations of this process
produced significant new commitments by the members and a wholesale restructuring (and renaming) of the organization. These rounds
operate much like a conventional legislature, with the parties free to
reach compromises and log-rolling solutions where their interests conflict. National legislatures tend to impose the greatest restraints on
this type of international lawmaking. The United States, for example,
normally requires its executive branch to seek congressional approval
before entering into serious multilateral trade negotiations, and then
background remains the Luxembourg Accords of January 1966, pursuant to which the members
agreed to disagree as to whether, where "very important interests of one or more" members are
at stake, a member may insist on unanimity. BULLE-N OF Tim EUROPEAN EcONOMIc COMMUtory 8 (Mar. 1966). Some observers argue that the Single European Act of 1986 superseded the
Luxembourg Compromise, but the French government, at least, has hinted to the contrary. See
generally Joel P. Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the InternationalEconomic Organization: Toward ComparativeInstitutionalAnalysis, 17 Nw. J. Irr'L L. & Bus. 470
(1997).
10 For examples of a legislative attempt to direct the executive with respect to an international organization, see, e.g., Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 286c, 286e-6,
286e-11 (West 1996).
11 See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991); J.
H.H. Weiler, Alternatives to Withdrawalfrom InternationalOrganizations:The Case of the European Economic Community, 20 IsR. L. REv. 282 (1985).
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insists on submission of the finished product to Congress for further
consideration. Even these restrictions, however, are different from
what the Congress typically imposes on executive lawmaking. In reviewing trade agreements, Congress waives its power to amend the
submitted proposal and to use supermajority voting in the Senate. In
the eyes of some, these restrictions substantially diminish the ability of
Congress to obtain changes in the agreements or other kinds of
concessions. 2
Aside from the indirect discipline that voters impose on legislators and executives who participate in international lawmaking, the
principal mechanism for limiting the effect of international public legislation is the opportunity member states have to choose how to implement what the international body enacted. But often this provides
only a weak constraint on what international legislation does. In the
case of the EU, this check does not exist; members can avoid the effect of Council legislation, if at all, only by withdrawing from the organization. 3 In many other instances, the choices facing a member
state are only slightly greater. A refusal to carry out the international
body's mandate may invite retaliation by the other members.
Executives not only legislate international rules, but they play a
complex and powerful role with respect to domestic implementation.
Whatever their commitment to the internationally generated rule,
they are free to hide behind what may be called the veil of collective
mandate. They may make arguments about honoring international
commitments to deflect responsibility for what international public
legislation does. That is to say, executives may act more or less
secretly within the international body to shape the rule adopted, and
then carry out the international mandate, either directly or by lobbying its domestic legislature, while disavowing responsibility for the
rule's content.
B.

Private Legislation

Private legislatures are organizations that draft laws in the hopes
that other bodies will adopt them. 14 They do not purport to enact
legislation themselves, but they often enjoy sufficient prestige to make
12 See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 143, 161 (1992).
13 Whether a member of the EU may secede from that body remains a subject of scholarly
debate. See generallyJ.H.H. Weiler, Alternatives to Withdrawalfrom InternationalOrganizations.
The Case of the European Economic Community, supra note 11.
14 In my discussion of private lawmaking, as well as in many other parts of this article, I draw
heavily on the work of Robert Scott and Alan Schwartz. See Robert E. Scott, The Politics of
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their recommendations significant. In the case of international private
legislatures, some bodies, such as the ICC, UNIDROIT and the
Hague Conference, select their membership without any governmental constraint. Others, such as UNCITRAL and the other agencies of
the United Nations, ostensibly rely on governments to nominate representatives, although the choice of nominee often reflects co-option
of the candidate by existing participants in the organization's work.1 5
In the field of international commerce, private legislatures have
enjoyed substantial influence. They have promulgated model laws
that many national legislatures have enacted, such as the Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG), the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of
Lading (the Hague Rules), the Convention on the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air (the Warsaw Convention), the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York Arbitration
Convention), the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in
Civil or Commercial Matters (the Hague Evidence Convention) and
the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (the Hague Service Cbnvention). They also have developed detailed form contracts, such as
the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits and the
Incoterms, that private parties widely adopt by reference and that domestic courts normally embrace as permissible expressions of contrac6
tual intent.1
Private legislatures by definition are not directly accountable to
anyone. Their influence and prestige, however, depends on their success in promulgating recommendations that other lawmakers will find
acceptable. The greater the success of particular proposals, the
greater the pressure individual states face to adopt them. This result
reflects the consequences of network externalities: once a model law
takes on the character of an international standard, a state or private
Article 9, 80 VA. L. REv. 1783 (1994); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy
of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L Rav. 595 (1995).
15 This discussion elides the question of whether the formation of an "international consensus" about a particular norm constitutes lawmaking. Especially in the field of international
human rights, norms seem to emerge more on the basis of a perceived osmosis of opinions
among internationally reputable jurists than as a result of a formal instrument produced through
collective negotiation. I mean to take no stand on the question of how and when international

consensus becomes law, but my analysis of private legislating is generally applicable to the process by which common practice may be transmuted into a binding norm.
16 See generally John A. Spanogle, Jr., The Arrival of InternationalPrivate Law, 25 GEo.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477 (1991).
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commercial actors derive benefits from conforming to it that are independent of the intrinsic virtues of the particular rules contained in
the law.
C. Adjudication
Most international organizations engage in dispute resolution of
one sort or another, but historically much of this has been ad hoc and,
except at the most abstract level, unprincipled. Moreover, those international bodies engaged in adjudication, whether arbitral or multilateral, traditionally adopted the conceit that they were lawfinders rather
than lawmakers. That is to say, these adjudicators tended to present
the norms that they applied as preexisting and based on received and
authoritative principles, rather than as the adjudicator's distinctive
and potentially idiosyncratic contribution to the process of norm
formation.
More recently, however, several international adjudicatory bodies have rather openly assumed the posture of promulgators of rules
that supplement international legislation. Perhaps the most remarkable of these institutions has been the EU's European Court of Justice.
That body has played a crucial role in the laying of the foundations of
a future European federal state.17
But the Court of Justice, although the most intriguing, is not the
only example of international lawmaking through adjudication. Dispute resolution panels organized under the old GATT and the new
WTO also have undertaken to develop a jurisprudence of international economic law. A number of decisions, building on opinions issued by earlier panels, have staked out ambitious and controversial
positions that have had the effect of expanding the scope of GATT
rules.' 8 These bodies may set a pattern for other tribunals under similar multilateral agreements. For example, the special panels for resolution of environmental standards disputes established by one of the
17 See generally EUROPEAN Busrnss LAW - LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSES ON INTE-

GRATION ANro HARMONIZATION (Richard M. Buxbaum et. al. eds., 1991); INTEGRATION

THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (Mauro Cappelletti et. al.
eds., 1986); COURTS AND FREE MARKETS: PERSPECIVES FROM THE UNITED STATES AND EuROPE (Terrance Sandalow & Eric Stein eds., 1982); PAUL B. STEPHAN ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL
BusINEss AND ECONOMICS - LAw AND POLICY 107-08 (2d ed. 1996).
18 See, e.g., United States tax Legislation (DISC), Nov. 12,1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.)
at 98 (1977); United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at
155 (1993); United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, No. DS29/R, 1994 GATTPD
LEXIS II (GATT Panel Report June 16, 1994); United States - Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/9 (WTO Appellate Body Report May 20, 1996) <http://
www.wto.orgtwto/dispute/gasl.ufm>.
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NAFTA side agreements, although not yet in action, potentially have
the authority to impose significant new obligations on the NAFTA
parties. 19
With respect to the EU, few mechanisms exist to constrain the
Court of Justice's lawmaking. The system of judicial tenure, as well as
the tradition of anonymity that prohibits concurring opinions and dissents, protect individual judges from retaliation for their actions. In
some cases the Council may have the power to invalidate or undermine Court of Justice rulings, for example by refusing to exercise the
authority conferred by the Court, but often that body seems happy to
wield whatever powers it can. The only remaining alternatives for
overruling the Court is amendment of the treaties on which the EU
rests or (arguably) withdrawal from the EU. Rarely if ever do these
option seem realistic.
For other international adjudicators, another layer of control exists because the parties to the dispute do not regard the decisions as
self-executing. 20 The losing side may refuse to comply with the adjudicator's disposition, leaving the winning side with the sometimes unsatisfactory option of imposing potentially self-defeating retaliatory
sanctions. In a famous early GATT dispute, for example, a determination that the Netherlands had the right to retaliate against the
United States for the latter's illegal (or more precisely, GATT-inconsistent) restrictions on cheese imports proved pointless.2 1 The Netherlands found itself unable to devise a sanction against U.S. exports that
did not entail unacceptable costs to its consumers.
In many instances, however, a country that has come out the loser
in an international adjudication faces substantial pressure to implement the tribunal's decision. First, some disputants can make credible
threats of retaliation against the noncomplying loser. Second, as an
international dispute resolution process matures, the participants may
develop a stake in the system's effectiveness that exceeds the costs
and benefits at issue in particular disputes. In recent years, for example, the United States mostly has gone along with GATT panel deci19 See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation Between the Govern-

ment of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the
United States of America, Sept. 13, 1993, arts. 22-36 (1993), reprintedin UNTrrED STATES GovERNMENT PRINTING OFiacE, NAFTA SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS (1993).
20 Cf. Footwear Distribs. and Retailers of America v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1078 (Ct.
Int'l Trade), appeal dismissed, 43 F.3d 1486 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
21 Netherlands Action Article XXIII:2 to Suspend Obligations to the United States, Nov. 8,
1952, GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 62 (1953).
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2
sions that condemned certain of its laws or administrative practices. 2
One reason for this virtuous behavior may be the success that the
United States has enjoyed in other cases, where GAIT panels have
forced U.S. trading partners to eschew practices that the United States
disliked.23 But as this stake in the adjudicative process grows, the international adjudicator has less need to worry about the wrath of
popularly elected legislators, and thus faces weaker constraints on its
behavior.

D. Administrative Interpretation
Many international organizations employ substantial bureaucracies to carry out their mission. The organization's staff in turn has the
authority to interpret the various treaties under which the organization operates and to apply those interpretations to particular
problems. The staff of the IMF, for example, interprets its Articles of
Agreement whenever it decides on the criteria a borrowing member
must meet to obtain access to funds. In practice these conditions can
be quite stringent and encroach on areas normally committed to domestic legislative discretion. Examples of such conditions include
stipulating a ceiling to government spending and directing the kinds of
economic development a country may promote. Even where the
members' representatives, acting as the Board of Governors, must approve the staff's decisions - as is the case with certain significant IMF
disbursements - the representatives remain sufficiently dependent on
the staff to accord the latter wide discretion.
In addition, the staff of an international organization, acting
either on its own behalf or through recommendations to the organization's governing body, can offer advice to national administrative bodies and courts as to the meaning of these treaties. For example, in
cases where domestic legal issues might be seen as depending on an
interpretation of the IMF Articles of Agreement, several courts have
relied on the determinations of the IMF staff (or of the IMF Executive
Directors acting in accordance with the staff's advice) as authority for
their decisions. Thus a lawsuit asserting a debt claim against a Mexi22 E.g., United States - Tax Legislation (DISC), Nov. 12, 1976, GATr B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.)
at 98 (1977); United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7,1989, GATT B.I.S.D.
(36th Supp.) at 345 (1990).
23 E.g., European Economic Community - Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and
Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th
Supp.) at 86 (1991); European Economic Community - Follow-up on the Panel Report - Payments and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-feed
Proteins, GATr B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 91 (1993).
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can bank turned on an IMF bureaucrat's determination that Mexico's
exchange controls accorded with the IMF Articles of Agreement.2 4
In theory the staff must answer to the organization's members for
its interpretations of international law. Using either their lawmaking
or budgetary authority, the members as a collective body can discipline the staff, and individual members may threaten to resort to the
exit option to rein in the organization's bureaucracy. But the exercise
of any of these disciplinary mechanisms entails costs. The individual
staff members of most international organizations enjoy the
equivalent of U.S. civil service protection, which frees them from the
most rigorous forms of discipline except for egregious misconduct.
And to thwart the staff, the members normally must act collectively
after having reached a consensus. Not all of the staff's activities require access to new funds, which individual members might tie to the
imposition of specific constraints. And for all the reasons previously
discussed, exit often is not an effective means of controlling what an
international organization does.
II.

THE POLITICAL

ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING

Having developed a typology both of international lawmaking
and of mechanisms through which international lawmakers are made
accountable for their actions, I now will discuss the incentives for creating international law. As the term "political economy" implies, I
will rely on the conventional, although by no means uncontroversial,
analytic constructs some economists use to explain political processes.
This approach focuses on hedonistic factors and portrays institutional
actors as fundamentally selfish. While acknowledging that inspiration
and ideology may motivate particular actors to behave in a way that
runs counter to their self interest, economic analysis does not attempt

24 See, eg., West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 482
U.S. 906 (1987) (Mexican currency control did not constitute an expropriation in violation of

international law because IMF staff had approved control as consistent with IMF Articles of
Agreement); see also Loeffler-Behrens v. Beerman, OLG Karlsruhe, Internationales Privatrecht:
Rechtsprechung, 1964-65 No. 194 (court accepts IMF staff determination that provisions of Articles concerning exchange controls do not apply to domestic law specifying what currencies private parties may use in financial contracts); International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development v. All America Cables & Radio, Inc., 17 F.C.C. 450,466-469 (1953) (interpretation
by IMF and World Bank executive directors of Articles of Agreement is binding on U.S. administrative agency).
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of
to explain this phenomenon. Thus, my account of the production
5
international law is incomplete, but I hope not without its uses.
A. The Demand for International Law
My analysis focuses primarily on the supply side of international
law, which is to say the factors that motivate the producers of this
good. As an initial matter, however, one should note the importance
of the demand function. The fundamental virtue of international
rules, and one of the reasons that the demand for them is as great as it
is, is that they may serve as beneficial solutions to collective action
problems. Other mechanisms, such as the tit-for-tat strategy, exist for
reinforcing cooperative arrangements, but credible and enforceable
promises to adhere to an express norm often will provide the best way
for deriving the greatest value from cooperation. 6 And it should be
obvious that now more than ever, international cooperation may bring
about great and widely dispersed benefits for a technologically sophisticated, globally interconnected world culture.
Of course, not all cooperation is beneficial. When discussing the
demand for domestic rules, a conventional analysis incorporates the
insights of public choice theory. This body of thought specifies the
conditions under which cohesive minorities may obtain laws for their
discrete benefit to the detriment of unorganized majorities. Similarly,
any analysis of the demand for international law must account for
rent-seeking by interest groups. The OPEC cartel serves as one prominent example where international cooperation may have led, at least
for a short time, to significant losses in global welfare. To take another example, a more successful cartel among importing countries,
the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), for decades has put a ceiling on
imports of textiles produced by poorer countries into the rich world.27
25 I previously surveyed the advantages and drawbacks of this methodology in Paul B. Stephan, BarbariansInside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and InternationalEconomic Law, 10
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 745 (1995). I will not repeat that discussion here.
26 On the role of the tit-for-tat strategy in international law, see Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern
InternationalRelations Theory: A Prospectusfor InternationalLawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335,
365-66 (1989); John K. Setear, Responses to Breach of a Treaty and RationalistIR Theory: The
Rules of Release and Remediation in the Law of Treaties and of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L.
REv. (forthcoming 1997); Paul B. Stephan, InternationalLaw in the Supreme Court, 1990 Sup.
CT. REv. 133, 151-152.
27 See Horst Gtlnter Krenzler, The Multifibre Arrangementas a SpecialRegime under GATT,
in Tim EUROPEAN CoMmuNrrY AND GATT 141,144 (Meinhard Hilt et. al. eds., 1986); Henry R.
Zheng, Defining Relationshipsand Resolving Conflicts Between InterrelatedMultinational Trade
Agreements: The Experience of the MFA and the GATT, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 45,62 (1988). One
of the Uruguay Round Agreements purports to wind down the MFA over a ten-year period.
Whether countries such as the United States that possess a significant but failing textiles sector
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The MFA in particular illustrates the darker side of the demand
for international cooperation. Collusion among the importing countries has created a regime that increases their producers' welfare
through protection from competition but harms their consumers by
reducing competition. There is substantial evidence to indicate that
the MFA injures the importing countries that maintain it, over and
above the unambiguous costs it inflicts on producers in the exporting
countries. In other words, in some instances interest groups may induce countries to engage in international lawmaking that disserves the
populations of the nations promoting the legislation. The illumination
of the conditions under which such outcomes occur is one of the central tasks of public choice theory.
B.

The Supply of International Law

What inspires particular actors to produce international law?
Different persons and entities have distinctive institutional roles.
Each has its own incentives. I will discuss in turn the executive
branches of governments of individual states, national parliaments,
private legislators, international adjudicators and international
bureaucrats.
1.

Executive Branches

With respect to international public legislation, representatives of
executive branches of governments invariably are the legislators. One
simple explanation of why these actors participate in this process is
that they have good reasons to respond to demand. In some countries, such as the United States, the leader of the executive branch
must stand for election. In others, such as the United Kingdom and
Canada, selection of the head of the executive depends on party success in legislative elections rather than personal electoral triumph. In
either case, these persons reasonably might believe that the winning
and retention of office have something to do with both increasing the
overall welfare of their country and satisfying discrete and powerful
interest groups.
Independent of the rewards to be obtained from delivering particular international laws to those who want them, executive branches
will conform to this schedule remains to be seen. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing The World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND OF MULTINATIONAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 85 (GATT Secretariat ed., 1994).
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have an incentive to engage in international lawmaking. This claim is
a corollary of the assertion that the executives are less accountable for
the consequences of the international rules they generate than they
are for their domestic actions. All other things being equal, executive
branches want to be seen as active and engaged. International negotiations allow executives, with their more or less unified hierarchy, to
operate at a comparative advantage in relation to multitudinous and
therefore less coherent legislators. These negotiations also benefit
persons within the executive but at some remove from the top, who
get access to foreign travel, media exposure and opportunities for advancement. Thus, to the extent that they are not disciplined for their
lawmaking activities, executive branches will tend to indulge in more
rather than less of this activity.
One implication of this hypothesis is that governments will seek
to produce open-ended rules that produce no significant effect on the
status quo. Several arguments support this prediction. First, incumbent governments, by the very fact that they hold office, ordinarily
would not want to upset the conditions that brought them to power.
Second, often the outcome of a substantial restructuring of an international regime would be uncertain, and governments must fear the possibility that a change with which they would be associated would have
negative consequences for their country as a whole. Third, competition among interest groups tends to produce a stalemate, with the
players preferring no change to any move that would bring about specific injuries to a well organized constituency. The only way governments can cope with such a stalemate without abandoning the
lawmaking project is to adopt rules that have the form of legal norms
but are sufficiently indeterminate to pose no threat to anyone.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical international regime that
commits each party not to impose its competition rules on international business transactions to a greater extent than would be reasonable under all the circumstances.' Although on its face this norm
appears to limit what states may do, a decisionmaker seeking to apply
it would find little guidance. Most likely a court, for instance, would
employ this norm only to support the result that it would have
reached in any event.2 9

28 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THro) oF FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1987).
29 Cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993) (majority and dissent each
assert authority of Restatement).
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More controversially, this hypothesis also suggests that executive
branches may be more willing than are legislatures to facilitate rules
that favor special interests at the expense of the general welfare. If
executives derive compensation from such interests (e.g., campaign
contributions, future employment) for the rules that they produce and
if a lower level of accountability decreases the political and other costs
of pandering to them, then at least some executives will surrender to
the temptation to benefit these groups. Moreover, the formation of
rules that favor special interests still would be international lawmaking, which executives should prefer for all the reasons outlined above.
At first glance, this review of what motivates executive branches
may seem unilluminating. It suggests that, acting in their capacity as
international legislators, executives may produce public-regarding
agreements that provide general benefits for their nations, welfarediminishing agreements that reflect successful rent-seeking by well organized interest groups and vague generalities that appear to do
something without helping or harming anyone. But as this list comprises the full range of possibilities for lawmaking, it adds nothing to
our understanding of the process.
But the analysis does not purport only to describe possible outcomes. It also suggests something about the distribution of legislative
products. In particular, it predicts that, compared to a more disciplined process such as one generally encountered in domestic legislating, international legislation may tend to contain a somewhat higher
portion of rules that benefit discrete interest groups and a considerably larger portion of vague, essentially content-free norms. To understand the basis for these predictions, one must analyze the role of
national parliaments in supervising the international lawmaking of executive branches.
2. National Parliaments

In some instances, notably with respect to some (but not all) of
the members of the EU, national parliaments have little or no control
over the international legislation that their executives generate. Even
in those cases where international legislation requires their approval,
and the demands of party loyalty and interest do not bind the parliament to the executive, the all-or-nothing posture of the legislature's
choice may diminish its ability to constrain the executive.
Consider the position that the U.S. Congress found itself in when
it took up adoption of the Uruguay Round Agreements in 1994. For
46 years the United States had belonged to the GATT. During this
697
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time that organization had served as a means for opening up other
economies to U.S. exports and as a forum for resolving trade disputes.
In spite of occasional setbacks in the GATT dispute resolution process, on the whole the United States seemed to derive substantial benefits from its GATT membership. But once the executive branch had
signed the various instruments that made up the Uruguay Round
Agreements, Congress faced a stark choice. It either had to accept the
Agreements as they were, with terms requiring the creation of the
WTO with substantial powers not possessed by the predecessor
GATF organization, or it had to withdraw the United States from the
only international regime that purported to provide comprehensive
rules for international commerce. The one alternative that no longer
existed was continuation of a generally satisfactory status quo.
For members of the EU, the choices are even less satisfactory.
Legislation of the Council of the EU, which comprises the executive
branches of each member's government, often does not require any
action on the part of national parliaments before it goes into effect.
Moreover, Council decisions on a wide and growing range of subjects
do not even have to be unanimous. Once confronted with a decision
it does not like but for which it has no legal basis to object, a EU
member must either acquiesce or secede from the Union. And even
putting aside the question of whether the Treaty of Rome permits this
step, secession would mean a sudden imposition of significant economic barriers on what is for each member a large portion of its
commerce.
To be sure, take-it-or-leave-it propositions put pressure on both
sides to avoid a breakdown. Just as the legislature will hesitate to repudiate an entire international regime because of one unsatisfactory
product, executives will avoid putting legislatures to that choice.30
But it seems a reasonable guess that in the context of international
commitments emerging out of otherwise valuable multilateral arrangements, the legislature will be more fearful of a breakdown than
will executives. First, executives have the advantage of going first, in
the sense that they present the question for the legislature to decide.
By framing the proposal to the legislature in a way that maximizes the
costs, in terms of opprobrium and retaliation associated with rejection,
30 See generally Saul Levmore, Love It or Leave It: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Exclusivity of Remedies in Partnership and Marriage, 58 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (Spring
1995). The League of Nations represents an important example where an overly ambitious Executive pushed the Congress into forcing U.S. nonparticipation, an outcome that the Executive
would have liked to avoid.
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they may decrease the chances of breakdown. Second, executives
normally will have an informational advantage over the legislature.
They typically remain in continuous contact with the executives of
other nations and therefore should have a better sense of what the
market will bear in terms of renegotiated agreements. The legislature,
by contrast, normally must discount the possibility of salvaging something if it repudiates the proposals.
The argument that, under these conditions, international rules
will reflect a somewhat higher rate of rent-seeking is subtle and far
from airtight. It posits that interest groups tend to have somewhat
lower costs of expressing their preferences to executives engaged in
international lawmaking than in conveying their wishes to domestic
legislators, and that the general public has higher monitoring costs
with respect to international lawmaking. First, the persons representing the executive in this process, and the agents chosen by interest
groups to represent their concerns, typically are specialists and repeat
players. Such actors find it easier to reach accommodation than do
outsiders with little opportunity to engage in log-rolling and other
types of long-term bargaining. Second, international lawmaking tends
to involve somewhat greater secrecy than does domestic lawmaking,
because each player may invoke national interest as a grounds for hiding its bargaining position from the other nations involved in the negotiation. Secrecy, in turn, further helps insiders. Finally, the
opportunity for national leaders to deflect responsibility for the content of international arrangements by hiding behind the veil of collective mandate may give these persons greater freedom to satisfy
rentseekers than they have in the domestic context. 3 ' To be sure,
none of these points is overwhelming, but taken together they are at
least suggestive. 2
31 Cf. Joel R. Paul, Comity in InternationalLaw, 32 HARV. J. INT'L L. 1, 70-74 (1991).
32 In an earlier article I offered with some diffidence an argument in support of the opposite
position, namely that interest group capture may be more difficult to achieve with respect to
international agreements than with respect to domestic legislation. Stephan, supra note 25, at
756-57. I noted that an interest group might have to obtain the support of all the governments
participating in the negotiations, not just a single lawmaker, and that the costs to the group of
obtaining what it wants would increase with the number of parties. What that argument did not

take into account is the possibility of log-rolling among the governments engaged in bargaining
over an international agreement. As with individual legislators crafting legislation, individual

governments can both advance a private interest's agenda and offer reciprocal concessions to
those governments that the group has not captured. Presumably the difficulty of obtaining a
desired result where numerous governments must vote for the rule is not intrinsically greater
than that entailed in gaining the support of the majority of numerous legislators, and the individual governments' lack of full accountability may make capture less difficult.
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The claim that international legislation will contain a greater portion of open-ended norms that essentially reify the status quo is easier
to explain. The production of domestic legislation entails some costs.
Almost all legislatures have gatekeepers who can charge for their help
in getting a bill enacted. Moreover, for the most part, legislators do
not derive advantages from the process of lawmaking simpliciter, as
opposed to the content of the laws with which they are associated. To
the contrary, a substantial body of literature indicates that legislators
derive most of the benefits of office through servicing constituent interests with respect to the executive branch. As a result, domestic legislatures are less likely to enact laws that do not serve any purpose.
But, as noted above, executive branches do gain from engaging in international lawmaking even if they do not accomplish much. All
other things being equal, then, one should expect executives of many
nations to work together to generate inoffensive international rules.
And for the reasons already stated, one should not anticipate that parliaments will do much to obstruct them.
3. Private Legislators
In a groundbreaking article on private lawmaking groups, Robert
Scott identified four attributes of these bodies which distinguish them
from conventional legislatures: (1) because they work on a projectby-project basis, log-rolling among proponents of different projects is
difficult, if not impossible; (2) members of the group act as individuals
without independent political power; (3) members of the working
groups that draft proposals have considerably more information about
the subject they address than do other members of the group; and (4)
members of the working groups have a stronger preference for changing the status quo than do other members of the group.33 Scott argued that where projects undertaken by these organizations attract
the attention of competing interest groups, the organization will either
reject reform or embrace only vague and unenlightening rules. Where
a project deals with a matter of concern to a single cohesive interest
group, it is more likely that the organization will propose more focused and constraining rules which generally accord with the goals of
with Alan Schwartz forthe interest group. A later article coauthored
34
malized and generalized these insights.
Organizations such as UNCITRAL and the ICC, as well as similar private groups engaged in the creation of international legal
33 Scott, supra note 14, at 1812-16.
34 Schwartz & Scott, supra note 14.
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norms, share the characteristics of the private law-making groups analyzed by Scott and Schwartz. They use specialized committees or
working groups to generate proposals for the larger body to approve.
Legislative projects arise episodically, with new working groups
formed for each project. As a result, committee members rarely if
ever have an opportunity to bargain with persons in the larger body
over the content of other projects. Nor do members of these organization have political power that they may exercise to influence the
positions of other members. The projects normally rely on working
groups that comprise specialists from particular industries, such as the
banking law experts that dominate the composition of the ICC's Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits.3 5 Others include representatives of competing interests, such as the first-world
and developing-world experts who worked on UNCITRAL's Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. 6
Scott and Schwartz argue that a significant portion of the rules
produced by private legislatures will correspond to what they call
"Model II." These are rules that exhort the decisionmaker to do its
best, but do not provide much concrete guidance, as to how that discretion should be exercised. In a smaller number of cases the work
product should constitute Model I rules. These are precise and therefore constrain the decisionmaker. Scott and Schwartz predict that the
Model I rules, unlike the Model II product, in most cases will serve
the purposes of one specific interest group.
The argument that private international lawmakers will produce a
large portion of open-ended rules that largely confirm the status quo
is straightforward. People are more likely to join working groups or
comparable drafting committees because they want to accomplish
something, not because they want to frustrate the lawmaking process.
Organized interests not represented in working groups will lobby the
general membership if they find a proposal threatening, but not if it
seems innocuous. The membership-at-large of private international
lawmaking bodies has no reason to expend much effort to reject proposals that offend no one. Accordingly, working groups will prefer to
propose rules that accomplish little (e.g., in situation X, the deci35 A list of the members of the most recent drafting committee and their professional affiliation can be found in INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUBLiCATION No. 500, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACrICE FOR DocUMENTARY CREDITs 6-7 (1993) [hereinafter UCP]. See

generally Ross P. Buckley, The 1993 Revision of the Uniform Customs and Practicefor Documentary Credits, 28 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 265 (1995).
36 See generally Arthur Rosett, Critical Reflections on the United Nations Convention on
Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 45 Ohio ST. LJ. 265 (1984).
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sionmaker should do what it believes is desirable) to not adopting
anything, and the membership and outside interest groups will have
no reason to oppose the adoption of such rules.
The argument that such specific and constraining rules as private
international lawmakers propose often will correspond to the goals of
a coherent interest group rests on several assumptions about the dynamics of private lawmaking. First, the membership as a whole of a
private lawmaking organization often will know less about the possible effects of a proposal than either representatives of an affected interest group or would-be reformers who join study groups. When this
is the case, the membership will have to make a relative judgment
about the claims advanced by interest groups and reformers. Scott
and Schwartz make the counterintuitive argument that in general an
interest group presenting a coherent and unopposed position will have
greater credibility than a reform party comprising academics and
other detached advocates of change. They assert that interest groups
will not press for the adoption of a proposal (as distinguished from
opposing a proposal that they believe to be harmful) unless they perceive the chances of adoption as good. As repeat players in the lawmaking process, interest groups also will tend to have more invested
in their reputation for credibility than would reformers, who tend to
attach themselves to single projects. Finally, members of the lawmaking organizations tend to prefer the status quo to any radical change, a
predisposition that will make them generally unsympathetic to calls
for reform. Given this balance of forces, the membership will tend to
approve rules that clearly will alter the way future decisionmakers dispose of issues only if an affected interest group presses for that result
and no other group opposes the proposal.
4. Adjudicators
Forests have been felled in pursuit of insights into what adjudicators should do to make the world a better place. A conventional analysis sees adjudicators as agents of the lawgiver. These adjudicators
serve to ensure that rules once promulgated will be enforced, and that
the compromises underlying particular legislative products will be
respected. Debate turns on how much freedom lawgivers should or
do want adjudicators to have to cope with the unanticipated. 37 What
37 See, e-g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation- in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 800, 817-822 (1983). In civil law countries, an effort was made to
implement an especially restrictive version of this theory; it forbade judges from any attempt to
divine how the legislature would deal with situations not expressly contemplated in the legisla-
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this discussion largely neglects, however, is a positive analysis of what
motivates adjudicators. One may accept the parallel propositions that
adjudicators have good reason to honor explicit constraints imposed
on their discretion and that no lawgiver can completely eliminate the
space adjudicators have to create law. What legal literature largely
neglects is the question of what, other than a vision of the good, true,
where their
or beautiful, motivates adjudicators to create law in areas
38
mandate permits but does not demand such creativity.

This paper is not the place to find a comprehensive answer to that
question. What I would like to do is distinguish two kinds of adjudicators that have a role in the creation of international law. The first type
consists of arbiters selected on an ad hoc basis to wrestle with particular disputes. What these decisionmakers have in common is that their
jurisdiction is permissive, in the sense that disputants do not face large
costs if they choose not to bring their claim before any particular person or tribunal. Examples include both the jurists who hold themselves out for selection to arbitration panels and bodies such as the
International Court of Justice, the workload of which largely depends
on the consent of the parties.3 9
The second type consists of professional adjudicators who have
mandatory jurisdiction over certain categories of disputes. These adjudicators have greater independence, in the sense that how they decide the cases before them will not have much of an impact on what
kinds of cases will come to them in the future. To be sure, their power
is not completely unchecked. Lawmakers may amend legislation or
constitutions to deprive them of jurisdiction if they push their authority too far. But at least for tribunals that have established themselves
sufficiently well to make assaults on their jurisdiction costly, the need
tive bargain. See generally John H. Merryman, The French Deviation, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 109
(1996).
38 There are important exceptions to the statement in the text. See Ronald A. Cass, Judging:
Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making,75 B.U. L. REv. 941 (1995); Duncan
Kennedy, Freedom and Constraintin Adjudication: A CriticalPhenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL ED.

518 (1986); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judgesand Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 1 (1993).

39 Even where a country announces in advance of any dispute that it will accept Internationa Court of Justice jurisdiction over a specified range of subjects, it has the power, if not the
right, to renege on this commitment. Perhaps the most controversial example of the exercise of
this power was the decision of the United States to refuse to recognize the authority of the Court
to address Nicaragua's complaints about U.S. involvement in the struggle against the Sandanista
government. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26). The absence of any power on the part of the Court to enforce its
judgment further compromises its independence.
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to please either disputants or the authors of the rules that come into
dispute must be less.
While most national legal systems have at least some adjudicators
of this second type, until recently international law did not. International adjudicators have served mostly in an ad hoc manner, with
tribunals formed to meet the occasion. It seems reasonable to assume
that those who wanted to serve more than once tried to develop a
reputation for reliability. One also may assume that these adjudicators understood at some level that surprising and alarming outcomes,
including ambitious claims of decisionmaking authority, would tend to
scare off future disputants.
But with the emergence of the European Court of Justice and the
establishment of a standing Appellate Body attached to the WTO, we
are beginning to see the work of independent and professional adjudicators. Secure both in tenure and jurisdiction, people who sit on these
bodies may have arrived where they are due to a reputation for reliability but do not have to cultivate this further. They may now surrender to other forces. The question thus becomes, what are the
temptations most likely to beguile them?
One possibility is that some adjudicators benefiting from job tenure and independence will seek simply to maximize leisure, while
others will invest some effort in increasing the stature of the tribunal
and the prestige associated with it. Much of the literature studying
organizational forms supports the hypothesis that agents freed from
substantial constraints - and who could be freer than a tenured, independent judge - tend to shirk.40 At the same time, much of what
we know of human nature suggests that persons unable to pursue
more material rewards often will respond to dignitary incentives.
Moreover, shirkers presumably will offer little opposition to those
seeking to dignify the institution with which they are associated, as
long as the increased status of their position does not entail more
work. Thus, we might expect that a dedicated minority of adjudicators
will strive to increase the stature of the bodies to which they belong,
and that an indifferent majority will not obstruct them in this
pursuit.41
40 See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Dempsetz, ProductionInformation Costs and Economic Organization,62 AM. ECON. REv. 777, 781 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm:ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,3 J.
FIN. EcoN. 305, 309 (1976).
41 For an earlier sketch of this argument in reference to the U.S. Court of International
Trade, see Paul B. Stephan, Further Reflections on the Implementation of ComparativeAdvantage Principlesin Trade Law, 2 J. LEG. EcoN. 111 (1992).
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Anecdotal, if perhaps idiosyncratic, evidence in support of this
proposition comes from the decisions of the first four decades of the
United States Supreme Court (Court). Several of the members of
that Court were famously lethargic and most completed their service
without undertaking anything of significance.4 2 But due to the energy
and ambition of a few members, notably Chief Justice Marshall and
Justice Story, the Court significantly expanded the scope and importance of its authority. It asserted and largely won acceptance of its
power to review acts of federal and state legislatures as well as the
decisions of state courts. And by taking a generous view of congressional power and restricting state lawmaking authority, it enhanced
the significance of the principal for which it was the primary judicial
agent.4 3
One cannot dismiss the possibility that this pattern of institutional
stature-building may be an artifact of the U.S. culture, and that elsewhere adjudicators are more content to serve exclusively as law finders. But consider briefly how the national courts of EU members
have reacted to the imposition of EU law. Great Britain and Ireland
aside, the legal systems of these members historically offered their
regular judges little or no opportunity to determine the legitimacy, as
opposed to the meaning, of parliamentary enactments and otherwise
discouraged overt judicial lawmaking. But the organs of the EU, especially the Court of Justice, have asserted that EU law applies directly to the members, much as the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution requires the states to apply federal law. Domestic courts
have embraced this doctrine, in large part because it provides a basis
for them to review national laws for consistency with EU norms. In
other words, these civil law judges also have seized the opportunity to
enhance the stature of their office. 44
To be sure, this account of the process by which civil law judges
have exercised their powers under the EU treaties is not the only way
42 Cf. David P. Currie, The Most InsignificantJustice: A Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. Cm. L.
REv. 466 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most InsignificantJustice: FurtherEvidence, 50 U.
Cm. L. REv. 481 (1983).
43 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
44 See Van Gend En Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1;
Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities (In re
Draft International Agreement on Natural Rubber), 1979 E.C.R. 2871; Costa v. ENEL, 1964
E.C.R. 585; Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. 837; Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R.

455; Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities
(ERTA), 1971 E.C.R. 263. See generally J.H.H. Weiler, supra note 11, at 2425-28.
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to interpret these events. The treaties seem rather clearly to anticipate the outcome that transpired, and the civil law judicial culture
places great emphasis (at least as seen from a U.S. perspective) on
following orders, however much they may discomfit the judge. One
may argue that the judges simply did what they were told, and did not
"seize" any authority that was not handed to them. But at a minimum
the judiciary of the EU states have not evaded the greater authority
that those treaties provided. Their actions, if not their words, and
hence what an economist would call their revealed preferences, are
consistent with the picture of a judiciary with some institutional bias
toward expansion of powers.
5. Bureaucrats
The literature on bureaucrats is more developed than that on the
judiciary, although hardly free from controversy. A strong claim with
substantial explanatory power is that, all things being equal, bureaucrats seek to maximize their budgets.4' Put more broadly, studies support the common-sense intuition that administrators in command-andcontrol organizations tend to prefer greater discretion to dispose of
larger amounts of assets.
As applied to international organizations, this proposition would
have several implications: (1) the staff of these organizations would
lobby their members for larger contributions; (2) the staff would seek
to insulate expenditure decisions from oversight by the members; (3)
strategies for reducing oversight would include decreasing transparency and tying expenditure choices to popular programs ("offers
that can't be refused"); (4) increases in overhead and .administration
should decrease transparency and link outlays to the organization's
continued survival; (5) in addition to the organization's express
budget, the staff would try to control or influence expenditures by
other bodies, including national governments; and (6) the staff would
attempt to maximize the value of incentives it may offer compliant
governments. I will take up the evidence that such behavior occurs in
international organizations in the next section.
III. Ti-m EVIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAWS

What I cannot do in this paper is prove empirically that the institutional and interest-group rentseeking associated with international
lawmaking exceeds by some observable amount that stemming from
45 See William A. Niskanen, Bureaucratsand Politicians, 18 J. L. & ECON. 617, 618 (1985).
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domestic law. Rigorous tests of this proposition will have to await
further research and the development of experimental strategies.
What I can do here is review several significant examples that illustrate the potential of international law for serving private welfare at
the cost of the public good. At this stage in my investigation, I would
be happy if I could convince the reader only that these illustrations
suggest that this thesis should be taken seriously.
I did not choose these examples randomly. They all involve international rules with potentially large economic consequences, and together they implicate all of the kinds of international lawmaking that I
discussed above. Others may offer counterexamples. One should remember, however, that my thesis is not that international lawmaking
is incapable of achieving many good and even great things. Rather,
my focus is on the relative costs of the process.
For the most part, I also have not tried to document the proposition that international lawmaking often results in platitudinous Model
II rules. Even a casual review of much of the important trade agreements of the past few years should convince the reader that much of
what was achieved at best constitutes "soft law" that may provide a
conceptual framework for decisionmaking but does not seriously constrain decisionmakers. Instead I will focus largely on rules that provide a specific return to particular groups.
A.

Cultural Preservation Legislation

I will begin by examining a fairly straightforward example of
rentseeking legislation enacted at the international level. In 1989, the
Council of what was still the European Economic Community (EEC)
issued a directive on what kinds of television programs broadcasters
could transmit within the Community. 46 The directive required that,
"where practicable and by appropriate means," EEC members should
ensure that broadcasters reserve a majority of their time for European
programs. By European programs, the directive meant works that
either were produced within the EEC or other European parties to
the Convention on Transfrontier Television, or were made elsewhere
in Europe as part of a coproduction agreement with EEC companies.
What the directive demanded in practical terms was that the governments of the EEC keep programs originating in the United States
from taking up more than half of the broadcast time. This directive
46 Council Directive 89/552 of Oct. 3, 1989, Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down
by Law, Regulation, or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of Television Broadcast Activities, 1989 O.J. (L 298/23).
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remains binding on EU members, although its implementation has
proceeded by fits and starts.
Why would the EU as a collective body admonish its members to
purge the airways of Hollywood's excreations? Broadcasters try to
give their audience what they want, and the sad truth seems to be that
Europe's viewers would rather watch Baywatch and Melrose Place
than the products of their own cultural idiom. If broadcasters want to
satisfy these desires, and if the viewers they serve have them, what
would motivate the governments of the EU members to frustrate the
viewers?
One explanation is that the governments believe that culture is a
public good akin to clean air or national security. Culture, the argument goes, both creates and enriches the social space in which people
interact. Erosion of a common language and the associations that underpin it may impoverish a nation every bit as much as an economic
slump. The state has an interest in promoting the transmission of culture, including, when necessary, using coercive measures to make the
population work in their national tradition rather than surrendering to
some flashy import.
One might not accept this explanation even as applied to a
monoglot national tradition such as France's. It is at least suspicious,
although hardly surprising, that so much of the articulated support for
active state promotion of culture comes from producers of culture and
some high-use consumers. But when transported to an international
organization representing many official languages and diverse, historically antagonistic cultural traditions, the argument loses all credibility.
The claim that, for example, French culture will be served by Britain's
Benny Hill reruns but not by Your Show of Shows from the United
States fails to pass the straight-face test.
If the protection of cultural integrity or some other public-goods
argument does not explain the directive on programming, then one
must look for a rent-seeking explanation. Fortunately, one need not
look far. Many but not all of the members of the EU subsidize the
production of both films and television programs. These state-supported producers have seen a large decline in their market share in
the face of U.S. competition. A single government, acting alone, may
have difficulty telling its electorate that television viewers will have to
give up some of the shows they want to see to shore up the value of a
failing industry that had captured the government's support. But by
recasting the decision as a European-wide choice, the governments
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can deflect to Brussels whatever criticism will follow from this
decision.
The choice of structure of this measure, namely as a Council directive, facilitates the evasion of accountability. An EU directive orders the member governments to take certain steps, in this case to
establish quotas for non-European programming, rather than laying
down those rules directly. Normally the steps involve administrative
action rather than new legislation, which might involve a potentially
recalcitrant parliament. Thus the governments that vote for the directive do not have to accept responsibility for any particular measure
undertaken to fulfill its mandate, but may use the directive to shield
themselves from criticism: "Is having the chance to see Baywatch
worth the loss of EU membership?" In addition, those governments
which for whatever reasons feel less of an obligation to protect producers of television programming from competition may drag their heels
on implementing the directive, while those who feel a strong obligation to that industry may do their duty by the directive with vigor and
enthusiasm.
How typical is the 1989 television programming directive? Casual empiricism suggests that the EU not infrequently enacts legislation
protecting private economic interests that individual governments
would have a difficult time justifying to their voters. Some, such as
the programming directive, become the subject of trade tension with
the country where the prohibited products originate. Others may slip
by without much notice. The latter outcome is more likely if the nonEuropean producers are dispersed and poorly organized, as is often
the case with respect to low-technology industries in developing
countries.
The larger point is not that the EU lawmaking structure makes
inevitable rent-seeking legislation of the sort exemplified by the programming rules, but rather that it facilitates the enactment of such
rules. How much that structure expedites rent-seeking, and how
much it enables the member governments to surmount collective action problems to promulgate welfare-enhancing legislation beyond the
reach of individual members, remains a subject for further research.
For present purposes, it should be enough to see the programming
directive as an illustration of how a reduction in accountability may
lead to the imposition of a rent-seeking international legal regime.

709

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

17:681 (1996-97)

B. Trade Agreements and National Parliaments
The programming directive may be seen as a naked case of rent
seeking enacted at the international level. More subtle problems arise
when international agreements require domestic legislation to take effect. The involvement of national parliaments means that a greater
number of domestically accountable lawmakers must participate in
the lawmaking process, even if the degree of accountability is somewhat attenuated.
The multilateral trade agreements negotiated through the GATr
institutions typify the process of domestic legislative implementation
of international rules. Very little in those agreements smack of private
interest protection. Instead, one usually finds the signatories making
broad if often vague commitments to open up various sectors of their
domestic economies to foreign competition. Reservations and
grandfathering provisions may dot the landscape, but these tend to be
minor deviations from a general commitment to liberalization that
does not fit comfortably into a special-interest story.
By contrast, the domestic legislation that fulfills these agreements
often enacts rules and procedural devices that clearly benefit specific
interests. Often the domestic bargains are quite explicit and have little to do with trade liberalization. This pattern seems to present a
paradox. If accountability problems means that one should expect
more rentseeking at the international level than at the domestic, why
does the critically important area of trade regulation produce the opposite result?
Take the Tokyo Round Agreements of 1979. Among those instruments was the so-called Subsidies Code.4 7 Signatories to the Code
accepted the obligation to make countervailing duties more difficult to
impose by, inter alia, limiting their use to cases where domestic producers could establish a causal link between countervailable subsidies
and their economic injuries. Many advocates of free trade believe
that governments undercut the tariff concessions they make through
the GAIT negotiating rounds by facilitating dubious claims of unfair
trade practices, such as assertions of countervailable subsidies associated with imports. A conventional analysis portrays domestic producers as an interest group seeking to use measures such as
countervailing duties as a means of protection from competition, to
the detriment of domestic consumers and, in most cases, the general
47 Agreement on the Interpretation and Implementation of Article VI, XVI and XXIII,

GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp. at 56) (1980).
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welfare of the nation. The Subsidies Code thus appear to restrict
rather than promote rent-seeking by making countervailing duties less
accessible.
But when implementing this thoroughly liberal agreement, the
United States substantially revised the administrative procedures and
judicial review mechanisms for these duties. 4 The new procedures
both reduced the discretion of the Commerce Department's International Trade Administration and the International Trade Commission,
each of which must make certain findings before countervailing duties
may be assessed, as to whether to impose those duties, and made it
much easier than before for domestic producers to challenge their decisions not to. Thus chastened, the agencies and the courts proceeded
to entertain a huge surge of countervailing duty petitions and to impose an unprecedented number of countervailing duty orders.4 9 One
cannot prove that these procedural changes by themselves caused the
expansion of these orders: foreign governments may have increased
subsidies to their producers, or more U.S. producers may have felt the
need for protection in the face of the 1979-82 recession. But the new
procedural rules, entirely the product of domestic legislation rather
than any GATT obligation, certainly did nothing to stem the growth
of countervailing duties in the years following their adoption.
If the implementing legislation for trade agreements generally reflects a higher level of rent seeking than does the corresponding
agreement, does it follow that my hypothesis about the link between
lower accountability and higher rents is wrong? Not if one conceives
of the agreement and the legislation as an integrated package, with
the latter's pandering to interest groups occurring only because of the
successful conclusion of the former. Governments use these agreements, one may argue, as a means of shaking down domestic interests.
The vaguely worded international commitment contains a threat to
groups currently enjoying protection from competition, but the language also gives the implementing states sufficient leeway to accommodate many if not all of the potential targets. An extreme version of
this argument would claim that governments enter into trade agreements so that they may conduct the exercise that is implementing
legislation.

48 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, §§'101-107, 93 Stat. 144, 150-93
(1979)(codified as 19 U.S.C. §§1671-1677 (1982)).
49 For a description of the increase in petitions, see Alan 0. Sykes, CountervailingDuty Law:
An Economic Perspective, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 199, 199-200 (1989).
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Consider examples from U.S. implementation of the Uruguay
Round Agreements. Superficially these agreements committed the
United States, among other things, to reducing the protection it gives
domestic farmers and textile manufacturers, and as such won praise
from trade liberals. But during the period that Congress deliberated
whether to approve these agreements, the Clinton administration increased the level of federal monetary support given to farmers who
export their crops and modified the rules for determining where textiles originated for purposes of administering ongoing import quotas.
The American Farm Bureau Federation and the American Textile
Manufacturers Institute, lobbying goups representing the affected domestic producers, responded to these naked interest-group
handouts
50
Agreements.
the
on
positions
their
by shifting
More generally, a recent study by Andrew Dick documents the
relationship between tariff-lowering agreements and disguised protection. Dick studied the implementation of the Kennedy Round tariff
cuts negotiated during the mid-1960s, which the United States phased
in between 1968 and 1972. His research indicated that roughly onefourth of the affected domestic industries received significant protection during this period through to the creation of new nontariff barriers, with the industries most threatened by import competition
receiving the greatest special protection. Although this evidence cannot establish a conscious link between the prior international agreement and the subsequent special interest favors, the sequence is
suggestive. 5 '
Perhaps this story seems too pat and assumes too much strategic
sophistication on the part of governments. But one should recall the
remarkable study of the U.S. tax legislative process produced by Richard Doernberg and Fred McChesney a decade ago.52 They linked the
successive waves of tax reform that overtook the United States during
the seventies and eighties to campaign contributions received by
members of the responsible congressional committees, especially the
chairs. They argued that the threat of tax reform triggered a response
from interested groups, while the enactment of legislation made the
threats credible. The campaign contributions reflected the success of
this strategy.
50 Farmers Get GATT Funding Assurances; Textile Rule Change Angers Retailers, 11 BNA
INT'L TRADE Rpm. 1547 (1994).

51 Andrew R. Dick, Explaining Managed Trade as Rational Cheating,4 REv. INT'L ECON. 1
(1996).
52 Richard L. Doernberg & Fred S. McChesney, On the AcceleratingRate and Decreasing
Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REv. 913 (1987).
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It does not seem far-fetched to argue that a similar process occurs
with respect to international trade regulation. If anything, the fact
that governments may reach these agreements without the direct participation of their potentially obstructionist parliaments, and'then may
present those parliaments with something tantamount to a fait accompli, makes soft commitments to international trade liberalization an
even more attractive vehicle for extorting rents from interest groups.
And unlike rents derived from threatened tax reform, a larger portion
of the side payments triggered by putative trade liberalization would
tend to go to the executive branch, which has greater control over the
agenda of trade negotiations.
To be sure, evidence that some governments use trade liberalization agreements as a pretext to sustain protection does not prove that
such agreements are necessarily pernicious, any more, than the
Doernberg and McChesney study makes a case against tax reform.
Properly implemented, liberal trade agreements may reduce the overall cost of rent-seeking by forcing domestic producers to compete
through better and cheaper products and devaluing the help that governments can provide. My point is only that what passes for international liberalization on closer scrutiny may turn out to be special
interest legislation, and that as a historical matter some trade agreements have enhanced the value of services rendered by governments
to discrete interest groups.
C. The Convention on the International Sale of Goods and the
Uniform Customs and Practice
Among private legislatures that make international rules, the International Chamber of Commerce and UNCITRAL deserve special
attention. First, their memberships differ substantially, even though
they share the avowed goal of promoting harmonization of the legal
rules governing specific bodies of commercial law. Second, the content of the rules they produce also differs significantly. Third and perhaps most important, their products include some of the most
influential bodies of private law governing international commercial
transactions. I will focus on each body's most well-known project,
namely the UNCITRAL Convention on the International Sale of
Goods (CISG) and the ICC Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP).
John Spanogle, a former U.S. delegate to several UNCITRAL
Working Groups, has described how that organization prepares its
legislative proposals:
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The process adopted by UNCITRAL often commences with the
convening of a "group of experts" which meets over a long period of
time in a Study Group to do initial investigation of issues. Then, representatives of States meet in a Working Group3 to draft the proposed convention - again over a long period of time.
Both the experts and the representatives tend to be law professors
rather than professional diplomats or private lawyers. In the case of
the CISG, UNCITRAL in 1968 took over a project that had begun in
1928 under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. The Working Group proposed a draft in 1978, which a
UN-sponsored conference embraced in 1980. Professor Allan Farnsworth of Columbia Law School headed the U.S. delegation, which
contained several other prominent academics, and a Hungarian
scholar presided over the conference.
The Scott-Schwartz model predicts that a process such as UNCITRAL's, with no permanent lawmaking groups and no direct participation of interest groups in its work, will produce largely Model II
rules. A review of the CISG confirms this. Many key provisions are
completely open ended, while others contain internal contradictions
that permit decisionmakers to reach whatever result they wish. Arthur Rosett has identified several of the key indeterminacies, including the Convention's scope,54 its rules of interpretation, 55 the rule for
open price and quantity terms,56 and the content of obligation of good
faith and fair dealing. 57 The cumulative effect of these provisions is in
many cases to allow courts to reach8 almost any result they want under
5
the guise of following the CISG.
The ICC, by contrast, represents international businesses rather
than academic and governmental 6lites. Like UNCITRAL, it
prepares packages of off-the-rack contractual provisions that at least
in theory are elective for the parties. But unlike UNCITRAL's Working Groups, the ICC Working Groups tend to comprise only representatives from a single interested industry. The Working Group that
53 Spanogle, supranote 16, at 498. See also John 0. Honnold, The United Nations Commission on InternationalTrade Law: Mission and Methods, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 201 (1979).
54 Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 10,1980, U.N. Doc. A/

Conf/97/18, art. 1 (1980), reprinted in 52 Fed. Reg. 6264 (1987) [hereinafter CISG]; see Rosett,
supra note 36, at 274-81.
55 CISG, supra note 54, at art. 8; see Rosett, supra note 36, at 286-88.
56 CISG, supra note 54, at arts. 14, 55; see Rosett, supra note 36, at 288-89.
57 CISG, supra note 54, at art. 7; Rosett, supra note 36, at 289-90.
58 Another indication of the CISG's indeterminacy is the work of scholars who have used it
to impose their own analytic template. Like the common law of contracts, the CISG permits a
wide range of substantive moves. See, e.g., Steven Walt, For Specific Performance Under the
United Nations Sales Convention, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 211 (1991).
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prepared the 1993 revision of the UCP, for example, consisted entirely
of law professors specializing in banking law and persons who worked
for banks; even law professors had been excluded from previous drafting bodies. 59 One therefore should expect the UCP to contain many
Model I rules that largely reflect the interests of the banking industry.
Banks issue documentary credits on behalf of customers and for
the benefit of persons to whom the customers anticipate making a
payment, normally after the beneficiary has met certain conditions.
The UCP provides a set of definitions and terms that banks and their
customers may incorporate into a credit. In practice the UCP has become the international standard for most letters of credit, and in particular for credits supporting international commercial transactions.
Specialists report that most banks would entertain dickering over the
applicability of the UCP only with the greatest reluctance.6 0
Issuing banks have a strong interest in fixing their obligation to
honor credits in a way that precludes the exercise of discretion on the
part of their personnel. They wish both to minimize legal risk and to
constrain the lower level employees that normally process credits. In
short, they want payment to proceed as automatically as possible
given the conditional nature of the instrument.
Accordingly, the UCP lays down a series of clear and precise
rules that facilitate the payments process. To a greater extent than
Article 5 of the UCC (the local law for letters of credit in most of the
United States), the UCP emphasizes the separation of the credit from
the underlying transaction for which the credit serves as payment.
The bank pays only against the delivery of documents, and the customer may not specify a nondocumentary condition.6 Presentation of
the documents will trigger the bank's obligation only if made to that
bank or its nominee, even if the issuing bank is acting as a confirming
bank for another issuer.62 Tune limits for examination of the documents are fixed, rather than left to an amorphous reasonableness standard.63 Where a bank attempts to amend a credit, the UCP treats this
step as creating an option exercisable by the beneficiary: the bank
must honor the amendment whether the beneficiary received adequate notice or not, but the beneficiary must comply only with amend59 Buckley, supra note 35, at 267.
60 See id. at 267-68.
61 UCP, supra note 35, at art. 13(c).

62 Id at art. 9(b).
63 To be precise, article 13(b) gives the issuing bank "a reasonable time, not to exceed seven
banking days following the day of receipt of the documents," to reject nonconforming documents. Id at art. 13(b).
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ments for which it gives express consent or with which it makes a
conforming tender of documents. 6 4 Each of these rules diminishes uncertainty about the bank's responsibility and provides reasonably
clear guidance to bank employees.
D.

The European Court of Justice

Perhaps the most vivid example of how institutional interest may
affect the outcome of international adjudication comes from the EU.
Earlier in this paper I noted briefly that the European Court of Justice, the judicial branch of the EU, has acted in a fashion that parallels
how the Marshall Court behaved during the formative years of the
U.S. judicial system. In particular, I suggested that the Court of Justice has both displayed a tendency toward self-aggrandizement and
has supported an expansion of the authority of the EU organs at the
expense of national lawmaking authority. I will expand on those observations here.
The self-aggrandizement of the Court of Justice comes from three
claims of authority it has made. First, it has asserted the power to
review the legislation and practice of the EU organs for consistency
with the various treaties and to invalidate EU laws that conflict with
those treaties.6 5 The parallel with Marbury v. Madison seems obvious,
although the form of the Court's review more closely resembles that
of the constitutional courts one finds in many continental European
legal systems. Second, it has maintained that EU law, whether the
articles of the treaties themselves or the lawful commands of the EU
organs, applies directly to the legal systems of the member states.6 6
Because it occupies the role of ultimate authority on the interpretation of EU law, this claim in turn means that the national courts not
only must follow EU law in deciding the cases before them, but must
defer to the Court of Justice when doing so. Here an analogy with
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee seems evident. Finally, the Court has extended the logical implications of these assertions by claiming the
right to ascertain the scope of the EU's authority, and hence of its
own jurisdiction. This assertion of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, as the
Europeans call it, closely follows what the Supreme Court did in McCulloch v. Maryland.
64 Id. at art. 9(d).
65 See, eg., Commission v. Council (Generalized Tariff Preferences), 1987 E.C.R. 1493.
66 Van Gend En Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1;
Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455.
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These successful assertions of power have created for the Court
the role of supreme arbiter of all questions that may plausibly be
framed as legal and involving the EU. Because the Court itself gets to
decide what is a legal question and what is EU law, the extent of its
powers is limited only by exceedingly vague political and cultural considerations. The jealousy with which the Court guards these prerogatives was exposed during the negotiations leading up to the 1993
treaty between the European Communities, as they then were, and
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which then comprised
Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. The first iteration of that treaty would have created a tribunal consisting of the members of the Court of Justice plus justices
from the EFTA countries to resolve disputes over that treaty's interpretation and application. The Court of Justice ruled that the establishment of such a body would violate the Treaty of Rome by
derogating from its exclusive and supreme authority to interpret the
Communities' law.6 7 The parties acceded to this claim, with the final
version creating a joint committee for interpretation that, as to all
questions of Community law, would be inferior to the Court.68
Armed with the authority of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the Court of
Justice has interpreted the various treaties liberally so as to permit a
significant expansion of EU power. As with the Commerce Clause
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the Court's decisions have both a
positive and negative aspect. On the one hand, they have read implied powers into the treaties so as to give the EU organs free reign to
legislate in areas of interest to them.69 On the other hand, they have
identified areas where, in the absence of explicit authorization from
EU organs, any lawmaking by the member states would, in the view of
the Court, impermissibly interfere with EU power. 70 Analogies to the
necessary-and-proper doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland and the negative commerce clause principles of McCulloch and Gibbons v. Ogden
have seemed obvious to observers. Taken together, these decisions
create the legal foundations for a dominant EU regulatory power that,
over time, may relegate the member nations to the kind of subordination now associated with the States of the United States.
67 In re Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area, 1991 E.C.R. 6079.
68 See In re Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area, 1992 E.C.R. 2821.
69 See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the European Commu-

nities (ERTA), 1971 E.C.R. 263.
70 See, e.g., Procureur du Roi v. Dassonvile, 1974 E.C.R. 837; Commission of the European
Communities v. Council of the European Communities (In re Draft International Agreement on
Natural Rubber), 1979 E.C.R. 2871.
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None of these claims of the Court of Justice rested on stunningly
bizarre interpretations of the Treaty of Rome or other authorities. The
very similarity to U.S. experience may suggest a certain inevitability in
the way the Court resolved these questions. Yet other choices were
open to the Justices. If nothing else, the tradition of a limited role for
the judiciary that existed in most continental legal systems might have
led the Court to take a more modest position. In particular, it did not
have to insist on direct applicability of Communities law in national
legal systems.
Students of international law, as all the members of the Court
have been, are well acquainted with the dualist notion. This concept
holds that international law binds only states in their dealings with
each other and not the relationship between sovereign and subject.
As members of an international body, the justices might have concluded that they had the power to expound on the meaning of the law
of the Communities, but that each member state reserved the right to
observe its obligations in the manner it chose, subject only to protests
and pressure from the other members. That they assumed the mantle
of monists at a time when most legal systems had only limited experience with the direct application of international law to private transactions suggests a certain willingness to build institutional prestige at the
expense of limited government. The judges chose to become lawgivers in a great multinational enterprise, when they could have remained legal consultants to an international committee of narrow
competence.
E. IMF Interpretations of Its Articles of Agreement
The IMF is one of the most important international organizations, if only because it handles so much money and is so intimately
involved in the management of so many national economies. Much of
its activity might be considered administrative rather than lawmaking.
Mostly it loans money under its control to governments, and states
conditions under which it would be prepared to loan them additional
sums. But on occasion its decisions have consequences that extend to
private parties. The most common situation involves a government
caught up in a financial crisis that imposes some sort of currency control on preexisting debtor-creditor relationships. Normally the currency control has the effect of barring the debtor from repaying the
loan and thus destroys or greatly reduces the value of the creditor's
rights. The legal issue becomes whether the creditor may challenge
the imposition of such controls as an illegal confiscation of its prop-
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erty. For many countries where creditors may bring such challenges,
that issue will depend on whether the country blocking the payment
violated international law. And that question in turn depends at least
in part on whether the blocking country acted in conformity with the
IMF Articles of Agreement, an international treaty that, inter alia,
deals with currency controls.7 '
Lawyers associated with the IMF have taken the position that
only the IMF has the authority to issue definitive interpretations of its
Articles and to determine whether governments have acted in conformity with them.72 In practice the IMF has used this power to take a
generous view of what kinds of currency controls the Articles permit.
When working with a debtor government to come up with a plan for
rescheduling its obligations, the IMF will insist on its right to approve
the government's currency control, but typically the results of this
preclearance are favorable. 73 In effect the IMF staff uses its capacity
to interpret the Articles as a means of expanding their control over
the budgets of debtor countries. Governments that share control over
their finances with the staff obtain a valuable privilege that can be
used to avoid liability in other countries' courts. Those that prove recalcitrant face not only a denial of access to IMF funds, but also an
increased risk of legal liability outside of its borders.
IV.

NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS

What should we make of all this? Suppose one becomes convinced that a significant portion of international law constitutes the
product of successful rentseeking on the part of either interest groups
or the institutions themselves. Should we then pursue prophylaxis by
erecting broad barriers against the recognition of internationally generated rules? Should we make it more difficult for executive branches
to craft multilateral agreements and for parliaments to implement
them? Should we regard the rules generated by private international
legislatures, international adjudicators and international administrative interpreters as suspect and presumptively invalid?
71 See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supranote 6, at arts. VIII,

xIV.
72 See, eg., JOSEPH GOLD, THE FUND'S CONCEPTS OF CoNvERT iBLTY (1971);
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(1979).
73 For examples of the IMF's behavior in such circumstances, see West v. Multibanco
Comermex, 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Callejo v. Bancomer, 764
F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1985).
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At this point, any response to these questions must be in the form
of a thought experiment only. I have taken pains to set boundaries on
what this paper purports to establish, and in particular have insisted
that the argument that some kinds of international lawmaking may
reduce welfare is speculative and not proved by the anecdotal evidence produced here. No policymaker should implement any comprehensive strategy to cope with the costs of international lawmaking
until it has independently come to the conclusion that such steps are
justified. One should proceed with this thought experiment, if at all,
only because the possibility is greater than nil that further research
may justify some restraints on international law making. Common
sense and experience may bolster the suspicion that this research will
bear fruit, but I make no stronger claim than that.
Furthermore, a decisionmaker could conclude that none of these
questions is relevant. Rather than developing a general critique of
international rules, the decisionmaker might seek simply to implement
predetermined substantive preferences, whatever they may be and
whatever the context in which they appear. Thus an economic liberal
might support and strengthen any international rule that augments
free trade and invalidate or interpret into meaningless any rule that
smells of protection. But such a decisionmaker would not be interested in accountability or legitimacy as such. Free trade, or environmental protection, or celebration of aboriginal cultures, or
empowerment of women, or advancement of human rights would be
the ends, and the means would be whatever works. For such a person,
a lawyer concerned about legitimacy and the disadvantages of lawmaking processes that -lack accountability would have nothing helpful
to say.
I am not so naive as to believe that choices about lawmaking process lack substantive consequences. All the same, issues of legality
and legitimacy in lawmaking still matter. If certain ends are good,
then over time an enlightened democracy might be persuaded to embrace them. We need to worry about obstacles to democratic decisionmaking that might prevent a good society from pursuing its just
goals. And if international lawmaking is disproportionately encumbered with such obstacles, we would have to ask whether international
rules prevent visions of the good, whatever they may be, from coming
into being. I accordingly will limit my normative discussion to the
procedural aspects of the creation of international norms, even though
the desired end is substantively better rules.
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A.

Strategies for Subversion

A decisionmaker, whether legislator, judge, administrator, or jufist, might try to thwart rent seeking by making it more difficult to
enact international rules into law. To be sure, the decision to embark
on this course is problematic. Even if one were to conclude that a
majority of international rules reflect interest-group rentseeking, it
does not follow that international rules as a whole decrease overall
welfare. It may be that most international rules reflect institutional or
bureaucratic interests but are not sufficiently concrete and constraining to do much harm, and that an important minority increase
welfare through the solution of important collective action problems.
Our concern should not be how many bad rules are produced, but
rather how bad are the rules produced, in comparison to the domestic
regimes that otherwise would exist. The latter question is much
harder to answer, and its difficulty should discourage decisionmakers
from blanket attacks on international lawmaking.
Nonetheless, there is a case to be made for mechanisms that
make the adoption of international rules more difficult. A decisionmaker reasonably might hope that drawing out the lawmaking
process might enable opponents to call attention to unwise or welfarediminishing proposals. In other words, the advantage of more rigorous procedural requirements for international rules would be to induce both proponents and opponents to supply more information
about the proposal. I will characterize the various requirements that
might be imposed and the methods for imposing them as strategies for
subversion of international lawmaking. 74
I would like first to consider briefly and to reject an approach
offered by Laurence Tribe. He would treat at least one aspect of international lawmaking, namely U.S. legislative approval of international agreements, as bound by substantial constitutional constraints.
He finds his constitutional hook in Article II, Section 2, which specifies that the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur." At least some class of international agreements, the argument goes, as a matter of constitutional law must be
74 For comparable attempts to develop legal rules that will reduce rent-seeking domestic
legislation, see Peter H. Aranson et. al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv.
1 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains,50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533 (1983); Jonathon R.
Macey, Promoting Public-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest
Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986); Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice"
An Economic Inquiry into FundamentalRights and Suspect Classifications,80 GEo. L.J. 1787
(1992).
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considered treaties and thus may become the law of the United States
only if a supermajority of the Senate approves of them.75 This con-

straint is stronger than may first appear, because many international
agreements in the economic sphere also raise or lower tariffs and thus

may be characterized as revenue bills subjected by the Constitution to
House approval.7 6 NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements, it
appears, could become the law of the United States only if a majority
of the House and two-thirds of the Senate approved them.

If one wishes only to obstruct the adoption of international agreements, this strategy succeeds admirably. 77 But that success comes at a
price to constitutional law. First and probably least important, the argument flies in the face of settled understanding. For at least a century Congress has not adhered to the rule Tribe purports to find in the

Constitution.78 Were one to disregard the crystallization of practice
and go back fo the framers, the case is deeply ambiguous. The fram-

ers' primary motivation for including the treaty language in Article U
almost certainly was not incorporation of the terminology of international law into the Constitution, but rather giving the federal government the power to regulate through the treaty-making process

subjects
outside the scope of its Article I powers, whatever those may
9
7

be.

75 See Laurence H. Tribe, supra note 1. The argument is an old one, although it fell out of
circulation after World War Il. See RESTATEMENT (THMnD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 Rep. Note 8 (1987).

76 To be sure, some lower court authority points the other way, but the Supreme Court has
not resolved the matter. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-998 (1979).
77 I do not mean to impute this intention to Tribe. His argument, it seems to me, leads one
to a position where some international agreements require the treaty process and others do not,
with the sorting being done by a political theory (or, a critic might assert, a collage of preferences) largely left out of the discussion.
78 Bruce Ackerman and David Golove argue that Congress has adhered to this practice for
only a half century, and that before 1945 it seemed to accept the position Tribe has propounded.
See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REv. 799
(1995). But they rest this claim on the assumption that Congressional legislation authorizing
international agreements in advance of their conclusion, of which there are examples as early as
the nineteenth century, somehow does not count. Id. at 820-27. Their attempt to distinguish
legislative preauthorization of international agreements from agreements that are implemented
through legislation rests on the demonstrably false assertion that Congress has the power to
repudiate the former but not the latter. For authority to the contrary, see, e.g., United States v.
Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986); Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. 190 (1888); Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. 616 (1871).
79 Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (Migratory Bird Treaty upheld under Treaty
Clause even though similar legislation had been held unconstitutional as outside the scope of
Article I). The review of the evidence as to the framers' intent by Ackerman, Golove and Tribe
is, to my mind, good law office history but not persuasive.
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More importantly, at least for us functionalists who find historical
arguments over the Constitution interesting but too often unhelpful,
there are no satisfactory candidates for a constitutional definition of a
treaty. That is to say, to which international agreements and norms
does the Senate-only rule apply? To be sure, the formal aspects of a
treaty are clear enough.80 But adopting an innovative constitutional
interpretation only to impose a formal requirement seems pointless.
Yet because treaties are defined by form rather than content, any
substantive definition would have to reflect values not suggested by
the Treaty Clause itself. Informed by a belief that international cooperation largely reflects rent-seeking rather than welfare maximization,
a would-be constitutional interpreter might take, for example, the extreme position that all international agreements, tacit as well as express, constitute treaties in the Article II sense. But then great
difficulties would arise. To cite only one problem among many, U.S.
courts on occasion have crafted particular common-law rules in the
express belief that they satisfied the demands of reciprocal international comity. Did Chief Justice Marshall violate the Treaty Clause
when he recognized foreign sovereign immunity to meet what he
deemed the reasonable expectations of other civilized nations? 8 '
Rather than constructing a constitutional rule of dubious provenance and uncertain operation, I would rather locate the issue in the
realm of statutory interpretation. Skeptics of rentseeking international cooperation could insist that the legislature give express approval of each specific rule embodied in an agreement. The
decisionmaker would not ask by what procedure did the legislature
give its approval, but rather whether the action taken constituted approval of the rule under consideration. Executive support would not
substitute for clear legislative action.
This approach has both a procedural and interpretive dimension.
It requires compliance with certain procedures - legislative authorization - as a precondition for a rule to take effect. But it also forces the
decisionmaker to interpret the authorization to decide whether it
80 The Vienna Convention treats all formal international agreements intended to create legal
obligations as treaties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Jan. 27,1980, art. 2(1)(a),
U.N. Doe. A/Conf.39127 (1969), reprinted in 155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333 (1969); RESrTATEMENT
(TFuRD) OF TnE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF rnm UNriD STATEs pt. III, introductory note
(1987). But agreements that are not memorialized in written instruments or otherwise are not
formalized presumably fall outside the scope of the Convention, no matter how strong and clear
may be the parties' intention to constrain their future behavior.
81 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); see also Stephan,
supra note 26, at 150-54.
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clearly and specifically covers the rule at issue. The U.S. law of international relations, at least, includes dozens of vaguely worded statutes
that might be generously read as giving congressional approval for almost any action by the executive. The subversive strategy would require a much more focused statement of legislative approbation.
The position taken by Justice Scalia in his Barclays Bank concurrence typifies the procedural dimension of this strategy. 82 Under pressure from our trading partners, the executive (until 1993) had
consistently attacked the California corporate income tax as applied
to foreign corporations, arguing that the tax undermined federal policy and prevented the nation from speaking "with one voice" when
dealing with foreign commerce. The executive even had signed a
treaty with Great Britain that Would have outlawed California's tax,
although the Senate had refused to go along. The majority opinion
determined that these various executive actions were insufficient to
invalidate California's tax and left open the question of whether the
executive alone could preempt a state rule of taxation. Concurring in
the judgment, Scalia urged that the President acting 8alone
had no
3
power to determine the constitutionality of a state law.
My intention here is not to debate the general merits of literalism, originalism, strict construction or any other interpretive strategy
intended to minimize the influence of nonlegislative actors on the application of statutes. The point is merely that this approach, as applied to international law, has two likely effects, each of which could
be salutary. First, a norm that refused to recognize an international
rule unless the legislature had expressly and specifically endorsed it
would result in recognition of fewer rules. Second, conditioning recognition on express and specific endorsement might induce the executive to be more selective in what international rules it bargained for,
and the legislature to take up its deliberative responsibility more
assiduously.
Of course, terms such as "express" and "specific" may seem more
hortatory than constraining. Committed deconstructionists are prepared to find ambiguity anywhere.' Even a more conventional decisionmaker could turn up many hard cases in the faithful pursuit of this
strategy. What should we make, for example, of rather clear ex ante
82 Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Board, 114 S. CL 2268 (1994).

83 Id.at 2287. For a comparable statement of the relative authority of the EU's Commission
and Council in the sphere of international lawmaking, see French Republic v. Commission (In re
the E.C.-USA Competition Laws Agreement), 1994 E.C.R. 3641.
84 See, eg., Anthony D'Amato, Legal Theory: Deconstruction: The "Easy Case" of the
Under-Aged President,85 Nw. U. L. Rlv. 250 (1990).
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authorization by Congress of executive agreements? Since 1934, for
example, the President intermittently has possessed legislative permission to negotiate reciprocal tariff reductions, with agreements that do
not cut preexisting tariffs by more than half authorized to take effect
without further legislative action. 5 Should we take Congress at its
word that the President may implement such agreements, or should
express legislative approval be limited to ex post consent? Good arguments can be made either way. On the one hand, all legislative actions involve guesses about the future, and specific ex ante constraints
on executive lawmaking (no reduction by more than half without additional approval) may serve as well as would the endorsement of a
realized agreement. On the other hand, by authorizing agreements in
advance of their consummation, the legislature surrenders the power
to weigh international rules in light of the circumstances of their formation. A fifty percent tariff reduction might seem insignificant at
one moment, and quite meaningful at some later date.
My point is simply that strategies for constraining the production
of international rules exist, and indeed currently are employed by significant decisionmakers. I do not make the stronger claim that decisionmakers generally appreciate the normative argument for
increasing accountability in international lawmaking and therefore
widely use interpretive techniques that hinder the adoption of international rules. To confirm this point, contrast the approach of Justice
Scalia in Barclays Bank with that of the Court in Dames & Moore v.
86
Regan.
Dames & Moore involved the validity of Treasury regulations implementing the Algiers Accords, an executive agreement that sought
to settle the Iranian hostage crisis by, inter alia, negating certain state
law contractual and tort rights held by private parties. In accordance
with the interpretive dimension of the subversive strategy, the majority determined that no act of Congress authorized every aspect of the
agreement. This part of the decision was not inevitable, as Congress
had enacted several broad statutes concerning sanctions against foreign states. But the majority then disregarded the strategy's procedural dimension. Noting a long history of settlement of foreign
claims, it held that the executive had the power to implement the Ac-

85 For the original authority, see Trade Agreements Act of 1934, § 1, Pub. L. No. 316, 48 Stat.
943 (1934) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1351 (1994)).
86 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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cords without legislative authorization. 7 It seemed to argue that tradition could substitute for congressional approval. Those seeking an
interpretive strategy to frustrate rent-seeking international agreements should deplore this argument, regardless of the underlying merits of the Accords.
These illustrations involve cases and may seem to imply that
judges should be the primary agents for implementing the subversive
strategy. But other decisionmakers also may challenge international
rules without going to the courts for support. A member of Congress,
for example, might question the validity of an executive action when
considering whether to approve appropriations. A state official might
refuse to comply with an international rule that lacks what might be
deemed sufficient legislative authority. Perhaps most importantly, the
academic community, and particularly jurists specializing in international law, might rely explicitly on the strategy when analyzing particular rules. By shifting the focus of debate, the strategy may change
the underlying legal culture.
B. Transparency
Subversion has its attractions but, as an ex post device for determining the legitimacy of international rules that already have taken
shape and attracted support, it has several drawbacks. First and most
obvious, it operates with respect to rent-seeking and welfare-increasing rules alike. Some good rules will be undermined along with the
bad ones. Second, the decisionmaker with the power to subvert the
rule will know what the rule proposes and may have difficulty disentangling the strategic issue from whatever substantive preferences the
rule may implicate. Third, the decisionmaker may find itself caught
up in a game of chicken. That is to say, support for the substantive
consequences of a rule may be so powerful as to discourage the decisionmaker from employing the interpretive moves it normally would
use to make adoption of the rule more challenging. Arguably Dames
& Moore arose in exactly this posture.
An alternative approach might focus less on the exact procedures
through which an international rule is adopted and instead ask
whether domestic lawmakers received significant amounts of information about the proposal. The issue would become transparency in the
lawmaking process, rather than the specific content of authorizing legislation. The greater the quantity and quality of information generated
87 Earlier case law took a similar approach. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203
(1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
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during the formation of the rule, the more willing would be the decisionmaker to respect the international norm.
As compared to subversive interpretive strategies, transparencypromoting procedures have a virtue that some might see as vice. An
interpretive strategy necessarily gives substantial discretion to the interpreter, normally a judge or bureaucrat. The decisionmaker must
decide whether a particular authorization is sufficiently clear and specific to extend to the rule in question, and that inquiry cannot easily
be reduced to bright line considerations. A transparency rule is easier
to make concrete, reducing the decisionmaker's discretion to determine whether compliance has occurred. The President either gives
Congress ninety days notice of an intention to enter into an agreement
or he does not: one may quibble over the content of the notice and the
specificity of the intention, but the room for legitimate dispute is
smaller.
A model for transparency-promoting rules can be found in the
procedures the U.S. government must follow when pursuing a trade
agreement. Since 1974, the executive has had to comply with several
specific requirements before submitting trade legislation to Congress.
To gain access to the "fast-track" process under which Congress
promises to give a straight up-or-down vote within a specific time period, the executive must first obtain permission from the legislature to
enter into the negotiations. It then must permit Congress to send observers to trade negotiations, give key committees sixty days advance
notice of an intention to enter into an agreement, wait a further ninety
days after announcing that intention before entering into that agreement, and after signing, submit to Congress draft implementing legislation, a list of proposed administrative actions and various supporting
statements. At each point where the executive must notify the Congress of its intentions, either branch (or, for that matter, either of the
key committees) may terminate the fast track authority by a simple
majority vote.' Congress remains free either to reject the trade
agreement or to refuse to stick to its fast-track rules, no matter how
strict the executive's adherence to these requirements.
Several scholars have attacked the fast track mechanism because
of what they see as a default by Congress of its duty to engage in
rigorous legislative deliberation. They seem to attach little impor88 See Trade Act of 1974, § 151-153, 161, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2290, 2317-26 (1975),
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-93, 2211 (1994)); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988, 88 1102-03, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1126-32 (1988), (codified at 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2902-03 (1992)).
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tance to the obligations the executive faces under the procedure, perhaps on the grounds that Congress always has the power to insist on
prior consultations in advance of the submission of a bill.89 I would
flip both points: the fast track procedure demands that the executive
seek legislative approval in advance of closing any international agreement and otherwise thrusts Congress well into the negotiations process. To the extent any procedure can, it puts extraordinary pressure
on the executive to specify what it will want from the legislature
before obtaining the consent of its negotiating partners to what would
become a take-it-or-leave-it deal. And the argument that the fast
track substantially reduces legislative review of the final product
strikes me as silly. The up-or-down component of the procedure is
built into any process that would approve an international agreement.
The Congress understands that it either must approve the deal as negotiated or force the executive to go back to the bargaining table: the
one option not available to the legislature is unilaterally to modify the
agreement. The fast-track procedure's one substantial concession to
the executive, namely the Senate's promise not to engage in unlimited
debate, is important but hardly fundamental. I am not persuaded that
the filibuster is a constitutionally necessary part of the deliberative
process.
The prior consultation components of the fast-track process are
illustrative of how an information-forcing procedure may work. With
sufficient ingenuity, other mechanisms may be devised that would
have the same effect, namely forcing international lawmakers to expose their processes to analysis and criticism in advance of formation
of any rule. A recent announcement of the WTO, for example, hints
that that body will publish more of the materials involved in the dispute resolution process than it has in the past.90 One might applaud
that step and still insist that before U.S. decisioumakers treat WTO
rulings as a form of law, the WTO organs must emulate the U.S.
courts in treating all submissions of the parties to a dispute as presumptively a matter of public record at the time of submission.

89 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 12; Edmund W. Sim, Derailingthe Fast Track for International
Trade Agreements, 5 FLA. J. INT'L L. 471, 476-479 (1992).
90 Decision of the WTO General Council, Procedures for the Circulation and Derestriction
of WTO Documents, WT/IJ160 (July 22, 1996); see also General Council takes steps to increase
public access to WTO information <http'J/www.wto.org/Pressrel/ngo.utm>. Although that decision generally excepts most dispute-resolution materials from its presumption of disclosure, it
implies that the panel decisions, which normally will be disclosed, will contain comprehensive
accounts of the parties' arguments.
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I would not contend that transparency-promoting rules are free
of the shortcomings associated with subversive interpretive strategies.
Even though, I have argued, these rules tend to give decisionmakers
less discretion than do interpretive strategies, one never can eliminate
all indeterminacy in any rule. And any residual uncertainty of application will allow decisionmakers to substitute their substantive preferences for rigorous and consistent application of the rule, and in
extreme cases to give in to chicken games. Moreover, identifying the
optimal level of transparency and the best mechanism for obtaining
that level remain daunting tasks. But even so, there seems a reasonable basis for believing that the promotion of transparency in international lawmaking, either in tandem with or in substitution for
subversive interpretation, might discourage the implementation of
rent-seeking rules.
C. Skepticism
Beyond subversion and transparency, a decisionmaker may rely
on a general skepticism when confronted with internationally produced laws. Skepticism is not the same as hostility or even the functional equivalent of a presumption against the validity of an
international rule. Rather, the decisionmaker might undertake an independent inquiry into the possible wellsprings of the claim. To what
extent, the decisionmaker might ask, does the rule at issue reflect the
institutional agenda of the organization that issued it or the desires of
private interest groups, and to what extent does domestic law command the decisionmaker to respect that agenda or those interests?
This skepticism is similar to but distinguishable from subversive
interpretation. Subversive interpretation as I have used the term involves the issue of validity: it asks whether a particular domestic legislative act authorizes the international rule in dispute. Skepticism
enters the picture when international materials are employed to interpret a valid but ambiguous domestic law. On the one hand, the
United States long has invoked the rhetoric of resolving ambiguities in
favor of complying with international law.91 On the other hand, that
formula says nothing about how decisionmakers should determine the
content of international law in the absence of an unambiguous commitment. A skeptical decisionmaker would not defer to international
bodies in deciding what international law is and what it requires of
domestic law.
91 See, eg., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190
(1888); Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
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Illustrations of how this skepticism might work in practice come
mostly from trade law. The welter of statutes governing U.S. tariffs,
and especially those involving countervailing and antidumping duties,
raise many significant interpretive problems. The International Trade
Administration of the Department of Commerce (hereafter ITA) has
evolved its own jurisprudence as to the meaning of these provisions,
which it expounds and applies in particular countervailing and antidumping duty cases. Sometimes these agency interpretations conflict with what GATT dispute resolution bodies have concluded are
the United States's obligations under the various multilateral trade
agreements. On occasion the parties obtain through their governments a GATT dispute resolution panel interpretation that requires
exactly the opposite outcome from that sought by ITA.92 These cases
present a reviewing court with three possible approaches: (1) undertake an independent determination of what the statutes require; (2)
defer to the administrative agency in cases of genuine statutory ambiguity; or (3) within the range of plausible outcomes, choose the one
that accords with the multilateral trade agreements as interpreted by
GAT dispute resolution bodies.
Consider the issue in Federal Mogul Corporation v. United
States.93 For purposes of determining whether importers have
"dumped" their goods within the meaning of U.S. trade law, ITA must
decide only whether U.S. prices are lower than home market prices,
not that U.S. prices are unprofitable; the difference between the U.S.
and home market price is called the margin of dumping. In making
this comparison, ITA must take account of value added taxes, which
are levied by many countries of production on domestic sales but are
refunded when goods are exported. United States legislation does not
allow ITA to subtract domestic VAT taxes when calculating the home
market price, but arguably permits ITA to increase U.S. prices to reflect the amount of taxes that could have been levied but were not. In
Federal Mogul, ITA made this adjustment by adding to the U.S. price
the absolute amount of value added tax that would have been collected if the goods had been sold in the country of production at the
home market price. The Court of International Trade instead ordered
that ITA determine the adjustment by applying the domestic tax rate
to the U.S. price, a calculation that normally produces a smaller in92 See, eg., Footwear Distributors and Retailers of America v. United States, 852 F. Supp.
1078 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994) (court deferred case while parties pursued GATI dispute resolution,
and then upheld Commerce position); Avesta AB v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 1173 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988), affd, 914 F.2d 233 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
93 Federal Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572 (Fed Cir. 1995).
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crease in the U.S. price and a correspondingly larger margin of dumping. 94 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed. It noted that both the
1979 GATT and 1994 Uruguay Round Antidumping Codes require
tax-neutral adjustments to make the home and import prices truly
comparable, and that the Court of International Trade's methodology
accounted for the tax in a way that would make the margin of dumping depend on the tax rate. Judge Mayer dissented, arguing that the
majority's GATT-consistent interpretation departed unacceptably
from the clear meaning of the statute.95
Superficially, the Federal Mogul opinion seems most consistent
with approach (3), which exhorts the decisionmaker to find the interpretation that most accords with the requirements of international
law. But in SaarstahlAG v. United States, a recent countervailing duty
case, the Federal Circuit seemed to indicate that approach (2) better
explains its stance. The dispute involved the question whether the
purchaser of a privatized business should be treated as enjoying the
subsidies showered upon the business while it belonged to the state. If
the answer is yes, U.S. law requires the imposition of a countervailing
duty reflecting the amount of the subsidy. ITA has taken the position
that the new owners may pay less for a privatized business because of
the prior subsidies and that the difference between what they did pay
and what they would have paid for an unsubsidized business constitutes a countervailable subsidy. The Court of International Trade
found this reasoning unconvincing, if not absurd, and ruled that an
open and competitive auction of a state firm would purge the privatized business of any prior subsidies. Judge Mayer, writing this time
for the court, ruled that the Court of International Trade had shown
94 Where the U.S. price is lower than the home market price for reasons not attributable to
the difference in value added taxes, using the home market tax rate to make an adjustment will
exaggerate the difference between the two prices. For example, assume that the tax-exclusive
price of a good is $80 in the U.S. market and $100 in the home market, and that a 10% value
added tax applies at home. The real difference in price is $20 and the preadjustment difference
is $30. Using the Commerce methodology, the U.S. price becomes $90, reflecting the $10 tax
levied on comparable goods at home, and the margin of dumping will be $20. Using the Court of
International Trade's methodology, the U.S. price becomes $88, reflecting a 10% tax on the U.S.
price of $80, and the margin of dumping increases to $22.
95 No GATr dispute resolution panel had squarely mandated this result, but another international body, namely a binational panel established by the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement,
had. In the Matter of: Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products From Canada
(AD), No. USA-93-1904-3, 195 DTAPD LEXIS 5, at 7 (U.S. - Canada FTA Panel 1994). The
Stelco panel recognized that it had to apply U.S. law in determining how to adjust U.S. prices,
but argued that a U.S. decisionmaker would not want to reach a result inconsistent with the
GATT and that the various multilateral trade agreements required an absolute rather than a
proportional adjustment.
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interinsufficient deference to the appropriate administrative agency's
96
pretation of what constituted the "receipt" of a subsidy.
What emerges from this and other trade law cases is a hierarchy;
when statutory ambiguity exists, international law trumps a court's independent guess as to what domestic law requires but not the administrative agency's. 97 Where the executive accepts the international
organ's position, the court will support the agency's choice unless the
plain language of the statute clearly requires otherwise. But where
the responsible agency disagrees with the international body, the court
will side with the domestic decisionmaker.
At least two arguments support what these courts appear to be
doing. The domestic decisionmaker, even if a bureaucrat, still bears
some political accountability for its choices; the international
lawmaker does not. What underlies the skeptical position is a belief
that the more accountable decisionmaker should receive the benefit of
the doubt. Second, as discussed above, an administrative agency that
participates in the international lawmaking process has many incentives to inflate the importance of what that process produces. Even
though the Trade Representative and not ITA serves as the negotiator
of trade agreements, ITA has an ancillary role in the formation of
these agreements. Where an agency such as ITA chooses to deprecate
an international rule, a decisionmaker should give careful consideration to its position. To be sure, ITA may be the puppet of opposing
rentseekers, and in particular of domestic producers seeking protection from foreign competition. But it seems improbable that ITA is
any more subject to capture by such groups than is the Congress that
set the statutory constraints on what ITA does.
Skepticism may also manifest itself in the reaction of the broader
legal culture to the ambitions of international organs such as adjudicators or bureaucrats. To take a concrete example, the claim of the European Court of Justice that it possesses Kompetenz-Kompetenz seems
at least as plausible as is the long-accepted authority of the Supreme
Court of the United States. Once one accepts that the European
96 Saarstahl AG v. United States, 78 F.3d 1539, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
97 This hierarchy is especially clear in Footwear Distributors and Retailers of America v.
United States, 852 F. Supp. 1078 (Ct. Int'l Trade), appeal dismissed, 43 F.3d 1486 (Fed. Cir.
1994). The court originally deferred the U.S. proceeding while two different GATT dispute resolution panels took up the issue of when U.S. obligations under the 1979 Subsidies Code went
into effect. After one panel ruled that the U.S. position did not violate the Subsidies Code but a
second panel determined that it did contravene the most-favored-nation obligation of the
GAIT, the court concluded that the delay was unnecessary. While the court believe a genuine
ambiguity existed in the statutory language, it considered itself obligated to treat the administrative agency, and not the GATT panels, as the tiebreaker.

Accountability and InternationalLawmaking
17:681 (1996-97)
Communities were meant to build a new form of international cooperation and that legality mattered to their architects, it does not seem
such a great leap to concede that the European Court of Justice
should behave in the manner of a domestic constitutional court. If the
architects of the Communities expected the Court to make law as a
necessary part of the construction of a new law-based international
economic space, then the Court's lawmaking power should encompass
the authority to interpret the international agreements on which its
competence rests. It does not follow, however, that the possession of
Kompetenz-Kompetenz implies a need for judicial lebensraum. The
Court could use its powers to constrain the authority of the EU generally, just as the Supreme Court, belatedly and many would argue ineffectively, has attempted to bring new life to the doctrine of dual.
federalism. To a greater extent than is true of the U.S. federal government, the organs of the EU lack the legitimacy that comes from accountability, and the Court could compensate for this difference by
holding the organs to a more demanding standard of authority. Where
such forbearance has not been forthcoming, the scholarly community
might use these arguments to admonish the Court.98
Again, these examples are illustrative only and not meant to suggest that courts are the only desirable audience for skeptical arguments. The reception of international rules and the success of
international lawmaking depends ultimately on the legal culture of the
societies that engage in this process. Here scholars and teachers can
make their greatest contribution to the evolution of international lawmaking. Skeptical arguments enrich the legal culture of the internationalists by exposing their doctrinal tools and underlying normative
positions to sustained critical analysis. Some rules and rulemakers
may not survive the analysis, but the legal culture as a whole becomes
stronger.
In other fields, we accept it as given that mature discourse means
that all issues, including the worth of the project itself, are on the table. Modern legal scholarship in most areas tends to devote, if anything, too much attention to the big questions. In constitutional law,
for example, the absence of any broad consensus about the purposes
or methods of the subject marks the starting point for serious discussion. Yet among international law specialists we find a widespread,
although by no means pervasive, conviction that more international
law is better, that human progress marches in step with gains in the
98 Cf. J.H.H. Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, Response: The Autonomy of the Community Legal
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extent and significance of settled international rules. Scholars debate
whether the particular international rules that we find are good or not,
but few question the assumption that more rules would be better.
Skepticism may offer an antidote to this unhealthy complacency
and hermeticism. By exposing rent-seeking rules and the shortfalls
that a lack of accountability may produce, we may sow seeds of doubt
about international lawmaking generally. These doubts need not be
destructive. Rather, the skepticism that breeds them may nurture
habits of mind that yet might encourage the development of better, if
not more, international rules.
D. Lawmaking Versus Administration
Up until this point, the normative portion of this essay has focused on devices that may constrain the production or application of
international rules. My underlying premise has been that insufficient
accountability in the lawmaking process may lead lawmakers to reach
too many results that serve parochial institutional or sectoral interests
at the expense of, or at least not to the benefit of, the general welfare.
In response to this concern, I have identified several means by which
international lawmakers may be constrained in such a way as to make
their actions more difficult, and arguably more accountable.
It would not be too hard to take the next logical step and deplore
all international activity by governments, whether lawmaking or not.
There is a deeply isolationist streak in U.S. culture, and my critics
might fairly accuse me of playing to that particular tendency. In this
final section I would like to offer a plausible, although by no means
compelling, distinction between international lawmaking and other
kinds of international activity, and suggest reasons why one might
worry more about the former. In other. words, I would like to sketch
an argument as to why one might remain an internationalist while expounding a critique of international lawmaking..
What I would like to do is return to the distinction drawn at the
beginning of this essay between, on the one hand, state activity that
constrains private actors and, on the other hand, state administration
of assets, physical and human, that by some consensus are seen as
legitimately the state's. I realize that many will find this distinction
difficult if not untenable. To begin with, one has difficulty conceiving
of private activity without the existence of state institutions to support
and legitimate it. Second, the alternating waves of nationalization and
privatization that we have seen this century suggest how arbitrary is
the boundary between the regulation of private activity and the ad-

Accountability and InternationalLawmaking
17:681 (1996-97)

ministration of state assets. Third, the administration of state assets
often can have profound consequences for private activity, as when a
government debases its currency or goes to war.
But notwithstanding these points, I still perceive, with respect to
democratically accountable governments, an important difference between the disposition of the things given to the government to administer and the imposition of rules on the affairs of private persons. In
the first case, the government is perceived as responsible for its stewardship of state property. In the second case, a government can deflect a certain portion of its accountability for bad rules by hiding
behind its international obligations. Rules are more abstract than
things, making responsibility for their consequences easier to avoid.
If we define international lawmaking to mean the generation of
rules that largely govern private behavior, then the outlines of an argument for treating lawmaking differently from administrating becomes clear. One could believe that governments should not impose
rules on private persons without going through procedures that illuminate which governmental actors have taken responsibility for those
rules, and still wish governments to have considerable flexibility in
conducting the affairs entrusted to them. One might distinguish, for
example, between a military base agreement under which two or more
governments decide how to use one government's property, and an
exchange of tariffs or quotas that necessarily affects the rights and
privileges of private persons. In the former case an electorate may
find it easier to tell whether a government has squandered the assets
entrusted to it, as by allowing foreign troops to occupy the country's
soil without offsetting compensations. In the latter case, the parties
may find it easier to hide behind the mysteries of the bargain.
In practical terms, this argument means that my main thesis,
namely that international lawmaking raises distinctive problems of accountability that affect international law's legitimacy, does little to illuminate many debates over the relative responsibility of the
executive and the legislature in foreign affairs. When the issue is, for
example, the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution or the
propriety of legislation barring covert action in Nicaragua, one might
argue that both the President and the Congress must answer to the
electorate for the choices they make, so that the actions of the one are
not inherently more or less legitimate than those of the other. Once
accountability drops out of the picture, one then may look to other
considerations, such as institutional efficiency or informational advantages, to determine who should decide what.

